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By the Warsaw Convention,' an attempt has been made to
establish a uniform system of liability on the part of carriers by
air engaged in the international transportation of passengers and
merchandise. The liability embraced is that which arises from
*An individual study made in conjunction with the AIR LAW INSTITUTE.
tMr. Sullivan was graduated from Northwestern University School of Law
in June, 1935, and is a member of the Illinois Bar.
1. The official name is International Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air. The Con-
vention itself is the work of the International Technical Committee of Aerial
Legal Experts (C. I. T. ti. J. A.) created at the International Conference
on Private Air Law held in Paris, October and November, 1925. This com-
mittee proceeded to draft a convention on the liability of carriers In air trans-
port, which was adopted at the Second International Conference on Private
Air Law held at Warsaw in October, 1929. The Convention became effective
as to the United States on October 29, 1934.
The revised translation of the complete text appears In Dept. of State
Treaty Information Bulletin No. 54, pp. 17-33 (March, 1934); 5 JOURNAL OF
AIR LAW 486 (1934); 1933 U. S. Av. Reports 302.
For full details as to the contracting powers, and the work of the C. I.
T. E. J. A. in connection with its preparation, see Stephen Latchford, "The
Warsaw Convention and the C. I. T. E. J. A.,'6 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 79 (1935) ;
John Jay Ide, "The History and Accomplishments of the International Tech-
nical Committee of Aerial Legal Experts," 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 27 (1932).
Other sources which are hereafter referred to in abbreviated form, are:
Goedhuis, La Convention de Varsovie (La Haye: Nijhoff, 1933). This work
Is particularly valuable because of the exhaustiveness of Its analysis.
Sack, "International Unification of Private Law Rules on Air Transporta-
tion and the Warsaw Convention," 4 Air L. Rev. 345 (1933).
C. I. M. Convention on the Transport of Goods by Rail, signed at Berne,
October 23, 1924. See text in Hudson, International Legislation (Washington:
Carnegie Endowment for Int. Peace, 1931) p. 1393.
C. L V. Convention on the Transport of Passengers and Luggage by Rail,
signed at Berne, October 23, 1924. See text In Hudson, supra, p. 1468.
Brussels Convention. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to the Limitation of Liability of Owners of Seagoing Vessels, signed
at Brussels, August 25, 1924. See text in Hudson, supra, p. 1332.
General Conditions of Transport. Agreement made between the air navi-
gation companies, members of the International Air Traffic Association (I. A.
T. A.), which Is composed of European air transport lines. This agreement
came. into force at the same time as the Warsaw Convention, February 13,
1933. Its text appears in 3 Revue Aeronautique Internationale 78 (1933).
[1]
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the contract of transportation; in other words, where the Con-
vention applies, liability is grounded upon the contractual rela-
tionship existing between carrier and passenger, or between car-
rier and consignor or consignee; all other sources of liability are
abrogated. The parties to this jural relationship (who may sue,
and who may be sued) are the passenger (or upon death, his rep-
resentatives) and the carrier, or the consignor or consignee (or
both) and the carrier.
The Convention does not embrace the liability of the carrier
to anyone not in privity of contract with him, 2 nor his liability for
damage caused outside the course of actual transportation (e. g.,
a passenger injured by the negligent maintenance by the carrier of
a waiting room or comfort facilities would be obliged to seek his
remedy according to the domestic law of the place).
The liability imposed by the Convention is (a) for the death
or wounding or bodily injury of a passenger, (b) for the loss of,
or damage to, goods transported, and (c) for damage occasioned
by delay in the transportation of passengers or goods. This lia-
bility is limited by the Convention except where, under certain
circumstances, the carrier is not permitted to avail himself of its
terms. But this liability is taken away (and this is the most im-
portant feature of the document) when the carrier brings himself
within the extensive exoneration provisions (error in navigation,
necessary measures taken to avoid damage, etc.). This is, in the
briefest form, a skeleton view of the Convention. In what follows,
an attempt will be made to analyze and evaluate it in the proper de-
tailed degree.
The Convention is appropriate for study at this time for three
reasons: first, because by virtue of ratification by the United
States, which became effective October 24, 1934, a proper under-
standing of its terms is essential to the American aviation industry;
second, because of the rapidity with which air transport lines are
establishing terminals beyond the boundaries of the United States,
the matter has become of immediate practical- importance; and
third, because of the possible revision of the Convention in the
near future, some preparation for presentation of the American
viewpoint is desirable so that its rules will be consistent, as far as
practicable, with the actual conditions under which the industry
now operates in this country. To this end, the approach used in
this study will be two-fold: first, analysis, or interpretation; sec-
2. See the Rome Convention which governs as to damages to persons
and property on the surface. 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 567 (1933).
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ond, criticism, with suggestions for changes. This involves an
examination of the significant sections, in their order, followed by
a conclusion stating recommended modifications.
This study does not take up a discussion of the section on
Transportation Documents which represent a field somewhat dis-
tinct from carriers' liability, and which would require, for an
exposition of any value, a knowledge of administrative detail in
the aviation industry which this writer does not possess.
II. SCOPE-DEFINITIONS.
Article 1. (1) This Convention shall apply to all interna-
tional transportation of persons, baggage or goods performed by
aircraft for hire. It shall apply equally to gratuitous transporta-
tion by aircraft performed by an air transportation enterprise.
(2) For the purposes of this Convention the expression "in-
ternational transportation" shall mean any transportation in
which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place
of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there
be a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are situated
either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or
within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, If there
is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sov-
ereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another Power, even
though that Power is not a party to this Convention. Transpor-
tation without such an agreed stopping place between territories
subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of
the same High Contracting Party shall not be deemed to be in-
ternational for the purposes of this Convention.
(3) Transportation to be performed by several successive
air carriers shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Convention,
to be one undivided transportation, if it has been regarded by the
parties as a single operation, whether it has been agreed upon
under the form of a single contract or of a series of contracts,
and it shall not lose its international character merely because
one contract or a series of contracts is sto be performed entirely
within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate
or authority of the same High Contracting Party.
While the title of this section (which is taken from the Con-
vention itself) includes both scope and definitions, there is little
in Articles 1 and 2 dealing with definitions. This general criticism
may be made of the Convention as a whole. Terms such as "air
transportation enterprise," "necessary measures," "error in pilot-
ing" are freely used in most important provisions with no attempt
to explain or delimit their meaning. Particularly is this necessary
in a codification which must be translated into many languages
and applied in many different legal systems. Without such def-
initions, too much leeway is left to be worked out by individual
courts, and uniformity (one of the principal objectives of the Con-
vention) is defeated.
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The expression "transportation . . performed by aircraft
for hire," is wide enough to include all situations where payment
is made in some form, and presumably extends to all flights whether
made on scheduled lines, or chartered trips, by carriers regularly
engaged in the business, or by an individual owner of a plane mak-
ing an isolated trip with a paying passenger, or carrying merch-an-
dise for a compensation. M. Goedhuis raises some borderline
cases$ and questions how they would be affected by the terms of
the Convention. For example, a case where an aircraft owner, for
a consideration, leases a ship, equipped to make a particular in-
ternational trip, to a private individual who himself wishes to
make the flight.4 Because the flight is international and for a con-
sideration, M. Goedhuis believes it would come within tie scope
of the Convention, and that the owner would be considered the
carrier, and the lessee, a passenger. This is a difficult interpre-
tation to place on Article 1 in view of other portions of the Con-
vention, particularly those contemplating the issuance of passen-
ger tickets, and those which speak of the carrier or his agents
taking all necessary measures to !avoid the damage. Such provi-
sions, on their face, contemplate the carrier or his representative
being at the controls or actually conducting the voyage in some
way. Furthermore, there is nothing in the relation of lessor and
lessee of a plane requiring the application of 'an international con-
vention; the lease transaction itself is governed by the law of the
place where it is entered into. If an accident occurs because of
the plane, for which the owner is responsible, this only gives rise to
an action based either on the express terms of the agreement of
the parties, or implied warranties in such contract, which again
would be governed by lex loci contractus.
Nevertheless, the raising of such questions does point to the
necessity of a more specific treatment of these situations. An in-
dication of what was in the minds of the drafters may be found
in the following taken from the preliminary discussions of the
C. I. T. E. J. A.:5 "M. Ripert believed that the basic question
was-When transportation is effected by one who is not engaged
in the business but who, for a remuneration, agrees to make a
particular flight, would one admit that such transportation does not
fall within the scope of the Convention? It must be apparent that
it would be dangerous to permit this gap, and that it is necessary
3. Page 94.
4. The "drive-yourself" idea in flying operationg is an innovation that
seems to be developing. See Junior Aircraft Yearbook, 1935, p. 101.
5. Compte Rendu, 3rd Session, p. 20.
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to give a definition large enough so that all possible forms of,
transportation can be brought within the scope of the Convention."
It is evident from this and the rest of the discussion by the dele-
gates that all international carriage of passengers, G goods, and
baggage, performed for payment, whether by an individual owner
of a plane not regularly in the business, or by a commercial trans-
port enterprise, comes within the terms of the Convention.
The second sentence of paragraph (1) makes gratuitous trans-
portation performed by an air transportation enterprise subject to
the Convention. Excluded is gratuitous transportation under-
taken by one not in the position of an entrepreneur. The intention
was, as may be gathered from the preliminary discussions of the
experts,' to leave unaffected such casual, isolated trips where car-
riage is afforded by a person not engaged in the business, with no
agreement that payment be made.
Gratuitous transportation may have different meanings. If it
is a question of a person who is aboard a plane without the knowl-
edge or consent of the carrier, the Convention should have no
application, whether the carrier be an air transportation enterprise,
or anything else. If the carrier's employee in charge of the plane,
without the knowledge of the carrier-owner, and in disobedience of
orders, takes another person aloft, is this gratuitous transportation
within the meaning of paragraph (1)? Where a person, by ex-
press agreement with the carrier, is allowed to make a certain flight
without giving any cash consideration, what was probably meant
by gratuitous transportation is reached; this writer believes that
the element of agreement between carrier and passenger should
be stressed to eliminate the situation where a person is aboard
the plane as a trespasser, or in violation of orders.
But even if cash payment is not made for the transportation,
is it necessarily gratuitous? Suppose that an individual owning
a plane for his own business and pleasure, undertakes to carry a
person in an international flight, the agreement being that the latter
will perform certain services for the aircraft owner at the point
of destination, and then returns to the place of embarkation. If
the question is whether any valuable consideration flows to the
carrier, this situation would not be gratuitous transportation, and
would be subject to the Convention notwithstanding the fact that
6. The inconsistency in the use of the word "persons" in Article 1,
and "passengers" in Article 17 appears to be an oversight in draftsmanship.
No reason suggests itself for the distinction. M. Goedhuis (op. cit. p. 92)
believes the word "passengers" should be used in Article 1 as throughout the
Convention.
7. Compto Rendu. 3rd Session, p. 20.
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the carrier is not in the position of one engaged in the air trans-
portation business.
While paragraph (2) of Article 1 purports to be a definition
of "international transportation" as used in the Convention, so much
meaning is contained in this expression, that the paragraph be-
comes one dealing with the scope of the Convention, just as much
as paragraph (1). Briefly, there is international transportation
(a) where the place of departure is in the territory of onhe High
Contracting Party, e. g., a flight from the United States to Mexico
(both parties by ladherence) ; (b) where the place of departure
and of destination are within the territory of a single High Con-
tracting Party but with an agreed stopping place within territory
subject to the sovereignty of another power, whether or not that
power is a party to the Convention, e. g., a flight from the United
States to the Canal Zone, with an agreed stopping point in Mexico,
or a flight from one of, the states in the Union to Alaska, with
a regular stopping point in Canada (not yet a party to the Con-
vention). International transportation does not exist, within the
meaning of Article 1, where either the point of departure, or of
destination, is not in the territory of a High Contracting Party,
even where an agreed stopping place is, e. g., a flight from Mexico
to Canada, with one or more stops in the United States.
"According to the Contract Made by the Parties":
This paragraph8 emphasizes the intention of the parties, as
evidenced by the contract which they enter into, in determining
what is the place of departure and the place of destination. For
example, a person who boards a plane in Chicago to go to El Paso,
will not be subject to the rules of the Convention because the plane
is blown off its course and required to make a landing in Mexico,
just across the border. Similarly, a contemplated flight from Chi-
cage to Mexico City does not lose its international character be-
cause the plane crashes a few miles away from' the Chicago air-
port. This emphasis upon the intention of the parties permits a
certainty in the application of the Convention, and makes it un-
affected by an incidental occurrence, such as a forced landing in a
foreign state, or abandonment of a voyage before its destination
is reached.
A disadvantage of using the contract of the parties as the de-
terminative factor, rather than such a possibility as nationality of
8. Article 1, paragraph (2).
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the aircraft (the suggestion of the Brazilian delegation), is that in
one accident the liability of the carrier to different passengers may
be governed by different laws. For example, M, a passenger, bound
for Mexico City, boards a plane at Chicago together with N, who
is traveling to El Paso. After traveling a few miles from the Chi-
cago airport, the plane crashes. M's suit against the carrier will
be governed by the terms of the Convention; he cannot recover
more than the limit expressed in Article 22. N may sue by local
law, and the amount of his possible recovery is unlimited.
Exactly the same is true in the transportation of goods; lia-
bility as to a portion of the cargo may be subject to the Warsaw
Rules; as to that which is being carried within the territory of one
state, liability is governed by domestic law. Another problem in
the same respect is raised by the section dealing with transporta-
tion documents. By Article 4, a baggage check covering goods car-
ried in an international flight, as defined by the Convention, must
be issued, and must contain specific data; 9 by Article 5, an air
waybill covering merchandise similarly carried in international
flight must be issued and also must contain particular details set
out in that article.10 If such a baggage check and air waybill are
not issued and do not contain such information, the carrier will
not be permitted to avail himself of the provisions of the Conven-
tion which exclude or limit his liability.' In the same flight, the
carrier may be transporting baggage and merchandise not subject
to the Convention; whether or not such goods require the issuance
of a check or waybill must be decided by consulting the particular
domestic law which applies. This necessitates the carrier's as-
certaining at his peril the fact whether or not individual passengers
and individuar items of cargo are being transported within the
scope of application of the Convention; or he may be able to de-
vise forms of transportation documents which satisfy both the
Warsaw Rules and the particular domestic law which governs.
9. ".. . the number of the passenger ticket, the number and weight
of the packages, and a statement that the transportation is subject to the rules
relating to liability established by this Convention."
10.- ". . . the place and date of its execution; the place of departure
and of destination; the agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may
reserve the right to alter the stopping places in case of necessity, and that if
he exercises that right the alteration shall not have the effect of depriving the
transportation of its international character; the name and address of the
consignor; the name and address of the first carrier; the name and address
of the consignee, if the case so requires; the nature of the goods; the number
of packages, the method of packing and the particular marks or numbers upon
them; the weight, the quantity, the volume or dimensions of the goods; a
statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability
established by this Convention."
11. Article 4 (4) and Article 9.
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"Whether or Not There Be a Break in the Transportation or a
Transshipment" :12
Nothing appears either in the preliminary sessions of the Ex-
perts or in the discussions at the Second International Confer-
ence on Private Air Law regarding the meaning of these terms.
If a "break in the transportation" is used to cover situations where
stops are made for meals, or over-night stops," the problem is
simple -enough. Likewise, where a plane is forced to land to avoid
bad weather conditions and resume the voyage with the advent of
more favorable conditions. The word "transshipment" may raise
more perplexing problems. In a case where passengers or goods
must be carried on the ground from one airport to another, such
transshipment should not alter the international character of the
entire voyage; if this is the effect of the phrase above quoted, the
result is clear. But in this connection, Article 31 should be re-
ferred to, which provides that in a case of combined transportation,
performed partly by air and partly by any other mode of carriage,
the terms of the Convention apply only to the transportation by
air. In other words, such incidental transportation on the ground
does not change the application of the Convention to the other
stages of the trip, but nevertheless such ground transportation re-
mains subject to local law.
Transportation With the Place of Departure and the Place of
Destination Within the Territory of a Single High Con-
tracting Party With an Agreed Stopping Place in the
Territory of Another Power:
The application of this type of international flight can best be
understood by considering actual flights. A trip from Miami to
the Canal Zone would be domestic; if a stop were regularly made
in Mexico, or Colombia, it would become international, whether
or not the territories in which such stops were made were parties
signatory. A more extreme example would be from Detroit to Buf-
falo; if a stop were made in Canada, the Convention would apply.
This may seem an anomalous result, but the drafters evidently had
it fully in mind; in the words of the Reporter, the restriction of the
agreed stopping place to territory of a High Contracting Party was
deliberately excluded "to extend as far as possible the field of ap-
12. Article 1, paragraph (2).
13. Such stops are frequently found on time schedules of air transport
lines. See The Official Aviation Guide.
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plication of the Convention . . and to grasp the first opportunity
to transform a domestic'flight into an international one."14
To what extent the stopping place in the territory of another
power must be agreed upon prior to the commencement of the
flight may present some difficulty. Very often flights 'are scheduled
between two terminals with provisions that intermediate stops will
be made to pick up passengers on flag signals.'5 Would such land-
ings be regarded as agreed stopping places within the meaning of
Article 1 (2) ? If not, could the terms of the Convention be
avoided by calling a stop where passengers are usually taken on,
a flag stop? Another difficult situation can be supposed: M, a
passenger, boards a plane at Detroit to fly non-stop to Buffalo. Ii
he has given the matter any thought, he will believe the trans-
action to be subject either to the law of Michigan or of New York.
Another passenger, N, purchases a ticket for St. Thomas, Ontario,
the carrier agreeing that a stop will be made at that point to put
him down. This differs from the flag stop situation in that the
stopping place is agreed upon before the flight begins. But it is not
an agreed stopping place as far as M is concerned. Suppose in
such a case, the plane crashed shortly after taking to the air and
while still within the Michigan boundaries. The carrier's liability
to N could not come within the scope of the Convention because
his point of destination was in a non-signatory state. In deter-
mining liability to M, the meaning of agreed stopping place would
become crucial.
Where a stop is regularly scheduled to be made, but in the
course of the flight a landing at that point is abandoned for some
reason satisfactory to the person in charge of the plane, e. g.,
weather conditions, quarantine restrictions, civil insurrection, etc.,
such change does not deprive the transportation of its international
character. This is provided by Article 3 (1) (c) which is a part
of the section dealing with transportation documents. 6 By virtue
of all these considerations, the expression "agreed stopping place"
has been set down for definition by this writer.,
14. Compte Rendu, C. I. T. E. J. A., 3d ession, p. 19.
15. The actual use of flag signals is being supplanted by radio com-
munication between plane and airport, but the same principle applies
16. ". . . the carrier must deliver a passenger ticket which' shall con-
tain the following . . . the agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier
may reserve the right to alter the stopping places in case of necessity, and
that if he exercises that right, the alteration shall not have the effect of de-
priving the transportation of its international character."
The logic of placing such a provision, relating to the fundamental applica-
tion of the Convention, in the section dealing with Transportation Documents
Is questionable. Furthermore, it is spoken of only in connection with the
passenger ticket and the air waybill. Doesn't it have any significance as far
as the baggage check is concerned?
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"Transportation to Be Performed by Several Successive Air-
Carriers":
By paragraph (3) resort is again had to the intention of the
parties-this time to determine whether transportation, the various
stages of which are performed by different air carriers, is one
undivided conveyance. A person in Bakersfield, California, wishes
to fly to Mexico City. He purchases a ticket from the X line which
will carry him to Los Angeles, and also a ticket for the rest of the
journey on the Y line, the two lines having an inter-company agree-
ment for the sale of tickets on each other's lines. So far as the
portion of the flight performed by the X line is concerned, this
is purely intrastate business. Yet, by virtue of paragraph (3)1T
when such a flight is coupled with the Convention-defined "inter-
national transportation" it likewise becomes international, "if it has
been regarded by the parties as a single operation." For that rea-
son, the X line must issue a ticket in accordance with Article 3 of
the Convention; the baggage check must conform to the terms of
Article 4. If an accident occurs on the portion of the journey
which it flies, the passenger's recovery may be limited by Article 22,
or he may recover nothing whatever by virtue of Article 20.
The practical significance of this feature of Article 1 upon all
internal flights must be fully appreciated. Any transportation by
air within the boundaries of the United States may nevertheless
become subject to the Warsaw Rules if it constitutes a stage in
"international transportation." 'While the ordinary American air
transport line, with no foreign terminals, may at the present time
look upon the possibility of a law suit arising from such internal
traffic connecting with international transportation as too remote,
the unusual increase in foreign travel by air within the past few
years will soon change those remote possibilities into actualities.
To meet this problem, carriers must be prepared to issue trans-
portation documents conformable to Articles 3 to 9, inclusive. It
is possible that in one accident, the difference between the maximum
recovery under the Convention and the usual amount of recovery
allowed by juries under the common law"' would make up for
whatever expense would be incurred in the adoption of such trans-
portation documents.
The emphasis placed upon intention of the. parties, both by
paragraphs (2) and (3), deserves further attention. A drawback
17. ". . it shall not lose its International character merely because
one contract or a series of contracts Is to be performed entirely within a
territory subject to the sovereignty . . . of the same High Contracting Party."
18. See cases dealing with amount of recovery, p. 37, note 96.
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in its use to determine the scope of the Convention is the difficulty
in proving what the parties intended. In so far as in a particular
case extrinsic evidence is available to prove what the parties con-
templated, well and good; but in the absence of such tests, what
must be done? Furthermore, what should be the result where
one party intended one thing, and the other party the opposite?
To what extentq will printed stipulations on the tickets and way-
bills be accepted as proof of intention? Perhaps these difficulties
are unavoidable. Their existence, however, must be recognized. 10
A factor which will tend to give intention a more tangible form is
the development of consolidated ticket offices which act as clear-
ing houses for many lines. This development is being urged by
air line companies for the attractive convenience it means to their
patrons. If a person can, through one of these agencies, negotiate
transportation which may take them over many lines, there is a
more plausible basis for the view that the parties have regarded
it as a single operation.
It should be noted that paragraph (3) is restricted to trans-
portation performed by several successive air carriers. Nowhere
in Article 1, which presumably sets out the scope of the Convention,
is reference made to international flights in which a portion of the
carriage is performed by a mode of conveyance other than by air
(except in the use of the word "transshipment"). Yet, by virtue
of Article 31, such a situation could come within the terms of
the Convention as to the stages performed by air, if the other
provisions of Article 1 are satisfied. For example, a passenger
bound from Chicago to Tampico leaves the plane at Dallas to
proceed to Brownsville by train because of adverse flying condi-
tions, the rest of the journey being completed by air. An acci-
dent occurring during any stage of the trip performed by plane
comes under the Convention, but any damage suffered while the
passenger is being carried by railroad is governed by local law.
For purposes of clarity, the extension of the Convention to this
type of situation should be indicated in Article 1.
In General:
In so far as paragraph (3) permits the possible extension of
the Warsaw Rules to a purely intrastate flight, though nevertheless
connecting with an international flight, a possible constitutional
19. Could a chartered flight constitute one of the stages of a voyage
performed by successive carriers, within the meaning of paragraph (3)? If it
was regarded as a single operation by the parties, yes. The fact that it was
covered by a separate contract, standing alone, would not be conclusive.
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question is presented. In the illustration previously used of a trip
from Bakersfield to Los Angeles and then to Mexico City, suppose
an accident occurs before Los Angeles is reached. In the litiga-
tion that results, the carrier may seek to avail himself of the
exonerative and restrictive features of the Convention. Might not
the injured passenger effectively contend that inasmuch as the
transportation performed by the defendant carrier was entirely
intrastate, no federal law or treaty can have any application there-
to? If there is a valid analogy in cases decided under the interstate
commerce clause of the Constitution, the answer is that when a
passenger or commodity has begun to move from the United
States to a foreign country, commerce between nations has com-
menced; the fact that several different and independent agencies
are employed in the transportation, some acting entirely within
one state, does not affect the character of the transaction.2 0
At this point an examination of typical flights between the
United States and foreign countries, most of them now established
with regular schedules, will be made with an attempt by the writer
to classify them from the standpoint of their being governed by
the Warsaw Rules.
(1) Flight from San Francisco to Mexico City-(a) Entire
trip performed by one. carrier. Convention applies; point of em-
barkation and of destination are within territory of contracting
states.
(b) From San Francisco to Los Angeles on A line, from Los
Angeles to Mexico City -on B line. Convention applies "if it has
been regarded by the parties as a single operation."
(c) From San Francisco to Los Angeles on A airway, from
Los Angeles to El Paso on M railroad, from El Paso to Mexico
City on B airway. If regarded by the parties as a single operation,
the Convention will apply to the flight from San Francisco to Los
Angeles, and to the flight from El Paso to Mexico City, but not to
the railroad transportation between Los Angeles and El Paso.
(d) From San Francisco to El Paso by air, from El Paso
to Chihuahua by railroad, the remainder of the trip by air. The
Convention does not apply; of the two. stages covered by air,
neither, by itself, would come within the terms of Article 1. (See
Article 31.)
(2) Flight from San Francisco to San Salvador, stopping,
among other points, at Los Angeles and Mexico City-The Con-
20. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U. S. 557 (18"70).
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vention does not apply to any part of the transportation since the
point of destination is in a non-contracting state.
(3) Flight from San Francisco to Panama City, stopping,
among other points, at Los Angeles, Mexico City and San Salva-
dor-The Convention applies to the entire transportation; the point
of embarkation and the point of destination are within the territory
of ia single High Contracting Party with an agreed stopping place
within a territory subject to the sovereignty of another power,
even though not a High Contracting Party.
(4) Flight from San Francisco to Rio de Janeiro, stopping,
among other points, at Los Angeles, Mexico City, San Salvador,
Panama City-The Convention applies to the entire transportation;
both the point of departure and the point of destination are within
contracting states. The fact that stops are made within non-con-
tracting states is immaterial.
(5) Flight from San Francisco to Honolulu-The Convention
does not apply; the point of departure and the point of destina-
tion are both within the territory of a single High Contracting
Party with no stopping place within territory subject to the sov-
ereignty of 'another power. The status of Hawaii with respect to
the United States-whether it be a territory, state, colony, or de-
pendency, seemingly is immaterial.
(6) Flights from San Francisco to Manila, with stops, among
other points, at Honolulu-The Convention does not apply if there
is no agreed stopping place within territory subject to the sov-
ereignty of a power other than the United States.
(7) Flight from San Francisco to Canton, China, with stops,
among other points, at Honolulu and Manila-The Convention
would not apply, since the point of destination is in a non-contract-
ing state.
The above enumeration represents only typical situations.
Other international flights which are now scheduled, as to Van-
couver, Winnipeg, Montreal, the British possessions in the West
indies, French and Dutch possessions in South America, could be
similarly analyzed only at the expense of great length.
Recommendations:
(1) Definitions should be more freely used.2 1 Among others,
21. Compare the extensive use of definitions in aeronautical legislation
in the United States. See Fred D. Fagg, Jr., "The Minnesota Aeronautics Act,"
4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 340 (1933) ; "The Uniform State Aeronautics Regulatory
Act proposed by the National Association of State Aviation Officials," 5 JOURNAL
OF AiR LAW 630 (1934).
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the following terms suggest ihemselves for a more precise delimita-
tion of their meaning:
Passenger-Should the term include one who is rightfully in
the plane, but not in the role of a passenger, e. g., a government
inspection official ?22 Should a stowaway be considered a passenger?
Carrier-It should be pointed *out specifically that this term
is not restricted to persons regularly engaged in the business. Also,
the difficulty presented by the situation where ownership and con-
trol of a plane are in separate hands should be met. M. Goedhuis23
suggests that the word be considered to mean the person with whom
the contract of transportation is concluded. This would be help-
ful, particularly where contracts are negotiated with air express
agencies, in which cases the agency is regarded as the carrier rather
than the operator or owner of the plane. But such an interpretation
should not be permitted to lead to confusion where passage is pur-
chased from a ticket agency, where the passenger is dealing with a
separate corporation whose shares are either owned by all the lines
whose tickets are handled, or by private interests entirely. In such
a situation, ordinary rules of principal and agent apply.
Gratuitous transportation-Should mean where no money con-
sideration is paid. The presence of consideration in other forms
should not make what is otherwise gratuitous transportation into
transportation for hire. It should not extend -to the transportation
of those who are wrongfully in the plane, because the Convention
as a whole seems only concerned with the liabilities growing out
of the commercial relations of passengers or shippers, and the
carrier.
High Contracting Party-Does this term include a state hav-
ing the power to enter into international treaties in its own behalf,
notwithstanding the fact that such state is subject, in some degree,
to the sovereignty of another Power, e. g., Canada ?24
Agreed stopping place-How do flag stops fit in with this
term? What is its application to the situation where a flight is
scheduled as non-stop, but the carrier agrees, just before the flight
commences, to make an intermediate stop for one passenger to
alight?
Transshiprnent-(1) What is the line of distinction between
22: In the United States it is a usual practice for Bureau of Air Com-
merce officials to ride, without charge, to their points of duty in air transport
planes, when space Is available.
23. Op. cit. p. 94.
24. By the, Imperial Conference of 1926, the right of Canada and the
Irish Free State to negotiate directly with foreign governments was fully
recognized. Thereafter, each Is bound only by a treaty signed by its repre-
sentative. But the sovereignty of these two dominions is by no means complete.
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transshipment as used in Article 1, and transportation performed
"partly by any other mode of transportation" as used in Article 31 ?
If carriage is arranged between two contracting states, and trans-
shipment is made over the border separating their two territories.
has this any effect upon the application of the Convention?
(2) The provision in Article 3 (1) (c) that the carrier re-
serves the right to alter stopping places in case of necessity with-
out affecting the international character of the transportation is a
matter of scope and should find a place in Article 1.
(3) The application -of the Convention to flights combined
with other modes of conveyance should be specifically treated in
Article 1, and distinguished from what is meant by transshipment.
(4) Since the drafters intended the widest possible extension
of the terms of the Convention, this writer believes it feasible, to
include a provision to the effect that where the point of departure
is in a contracting state, and the point of destination is in a non-
contracting state, but where one or more stopping places are lo-
cated within the territory of contracting states other than the High
Contracting Party; in which the point of departure is located, the
Convention shall apply to that part of the transportation performed
up to the time of the last stopping place situated within the ter-
ritory of a High Contracting Party. For example, in a flight from
Mexico City to Montreal, with several stops in the United States,
as the Convention stands, no part of this flight would come within
its terms since the point of destination is not in a High Contracting
Party. Under the above recommendation, the Convention would
apply to the flight up to the time of the last stopping place in the
United States. Similarly, where the point of departure is in a non-
contracting state, and the point of destination is in a contracting
state, and where one or more stopping places are located within
the territory of contracting states other than the High Contracting
Party in which the point of destination is located, the Convention
shall apply to that part of the transportation performed from the
time of the first stopping place situated within the territory of a
High Contracting Party up to the time that the point of destination
is reached. An example of this would be a flight from Vancouver
to Mexico City, via Seattle, San Francisco 'and Los Angeles. This
innovation would permit the Convention to govern that part of the
flight from Seattle to Mexico City.
Article 2. (1) This Convention shall apply to transportation
performed by the State or by legal entites constituted under
public law provided It falls within the conditions laid. down in
Article 1.
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(2) This Convention shall not apply to transportation per-
formed under the terms of any international postal Convention.
In connection with Article 2, the British Carriage By Air
Act 25 provides that:
"Every High Contracting Party to the Convention who has not availed
himself of the provisions of the additional Protocol thereto shall, for the
purposes of any action brought in a court in the United Kingdom in accord-
ance with the provisions of article 28 to enforce a claim in respect of car-
riage undertaken by him, be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of
that court, and accordingly rules of court may provide for the manner in
which any such action is to be commenced and carried on; but nothing in
this section shall authorize the issue of execution against the property of any
High Contracting Party."
This article does bring up the difficult question of a suit against a
sovereignty. But this is more a matter to be governed by the state
against which suit is sought to be brought; it can hardly be con-
tended that a state ratifying the Convention, without the additional
protocol, thereby impliedly consents to being sued; only the clear-
est of express terms could be said to have that effect.
Because of the insistence of the British delegation of their
right of reservation to paragraph (1) of this article, and after
heated objections to the British stand on the part of other dele-
gates,2" an additional protocol was added by which the contracting
parties reserve the right to declare that paragraph (1) of this arti-
cle shall not apply to international transportation by air performed
directly by the State, or by any territory under its sovereignty.
The international transportation contemplated by this reservation
evidently includes all types of ;air transport performed "directly by
the State"-purely commercial transportation, as well as that per-
formed only in the public interest. As pointed out by M. Ripert, "2 7
"The tendency of all laws, at the present time, is to treat commer-
cial undertakings by the State on a parity with the enterprises
of private individuals."
The reservation permitted by the Additional Protocol was ex-
ercised by the United States Senate at the time it gave its advice
and consent to adherence. 28
25. 22 and 23 Geo. 5, ch. 36 (1932).
26. Proc~s Verbaux, p. 97. The Italian delegate stated: "The British
reservation has a very great practical importance; for the moment It has none,
since there are no air transport companies belonging to the State, but none-
theless, the fact remains that the hypothesis may become a reality."
See Maschino, "La Convention de Varsovie et la RWsponsabilit du 'Trans-
porteur Adrien," 14 Droit Adrien 4, 7 (1930).
27. Proe~s Verbanx, p. 98.
28. See Latchford, op. cit. p. 83.
The reservation contained in the Brussels Convention (Article 13) is more
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III. LIABILITY OF THE CARRIER.
Article 17. The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained
in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any
other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which
caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft
or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or dis-
embarking.
Who Is the Carrier?
The ambiguity in the use of the word carrier, as used in Arti-
cle 17 with respect to passengers, and in Article 18 with respect to
goods, would be clarified by a definition in Article 1, as previously
suggested. Goedhuis 29 points out that it may mean proprietor, the
charterer, or the owner; also, that the matter of this definition was
sent back to the C.' I. T. E. J. A. for further consideration. It
would seem that mere ownership would have no controlling effect
in determining who is liable.30 It is the one who undertakes to
carry who assumes the burden of liability, regardless of the name
or ownership of the means of conveyance by which the transporta-
tion is effected. This has been recognized in the general law of
carriers in the United States, regarding the liability of express
companies. Goods which they undertake to transport are con-
sidered to be in their continuous custody even though the actual
transportation is effected by means of vehicles belonging to and
controlled by others. Their name or ostensible acting as agents or
forwarders is not allowed to change this rule of liability. A view
of the problem raised in such a situation can be seen in Kentucky
Bank v. Adams Express Co.,3' wherein the express company under-
took to transport money from one city to another for the plaintiff.
The train in which the money was being carried fell from a trestle
and was destroyed, together with the money, by fire, the accident
evidently caused by the negligent care of the trestle by the railroad
company. The court viewed the railroad as agent of the express
company and stated that the fact that the latter had no control
over the railroad company or its servants was immaterial. "Con-
trol of the conduct of an agency is not in all cases essential to lia-
bility for the consequences of that conduct." The air express agen-
limited: "This Convention does not apply to vessels of war nor to Govern-
ment vessels appropriated exclusively to the public service."
29. Op. cit., p. 93.
30. Yet, in the field of maritime law, the Harter Act emphasizes the lia-
bility of the owner, "If the owner exercises due negligence, etc., neither the
vessel, her owner, charterers, or agents shall be responsible (when the fault
is due to an error in navigation or management) nor shall the vessel, her owner,
charterers, agents, or master, be held liable for losses arising from dangers
of the sea, acts of God," etc. 46 U. S. C. A. 192.
31. 93 U. S. 174 (1876)
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cy presents the same problems, since the rate, structure, regula-
tions, inter-company arrangements, etc., are almost exactly similar
to those used by the railway express agency. 2 Because of this, and
because the Convention does not specifically treat this phase of air
transportation, the law that has developed in the United States
regarding express companies will probably furnish valuable aid in
air transport litigation. 3
Another development in aviation can be considered with regard
to the scope of the word "carrier." Some air lines have arrange-
ments whereby telegraph companies provide pick-up and delivery
service in the transportation of merchandise. Such telegraph com-
panies should not be regarded as carriers within the meaning of
the Convention. Although the shipper and consignee deal di-
rectly with them, they act as agents rather than independent con-
tractors. They do not, like the express agencies, set the rates for
the transportation.
Who Is a Passenger?
There must be a contractual relation of passenger and carrier;
Article 3 (1) specifically provides that a passenger ticket must
have been issued and delivered. Otherwise the carrier "shall not
be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of this Conven..
tion which exclude or limit his liability." 34  Gratuitous transporta-
tion performed by an air transportation enterprise is expressly
included within the terms of the Convention.35 Insofar as this
means transportation furnished without charge, but to serve a pur-
pose of the carrier, e. g., the carrying of a notable person for ad-
vertising value, the carrying of a representative of the company
to a new post of duty, or of an attorney to defend an action in
another country-this provision cannot be criticized. In such a
case, there is as much a quid pro quo as where a passenger pays the
regular rate. Furthermore, there is nothing in the relationship be-
tween carrier and passenger in such gratuitous transportation which
presents a characteristic justifying a different standard of lia-
bility s  But even if transportation is thus offered gratuitously,
the carrier, to preserve his rights under the Convention, should
32. Frank E. Quindry, "Air Express," 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 145 (1933).
33. See Moore, Carriers, p. 35, sec. 9.
o 34. Article 3 (2).Note that the passenger ticket may be In any form; no sanction Is im-posed for failure to Include In it the details specified in Article 3 (1). Theprovision as to baggage checks (Article 4) and waybills (Article 5) differs.Each must contain certain of the particulars mentioned for the carrier to
avail himself of the protective features of the Convention.
35. See discussion In connection with Article 1 (1).
36. See Goedhuis, p. 87 et seq.
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issue a passenger ticket. This entire matter would be clarified
by an adequate definition of gratuitous transportation, as recom-
mended at the end of Article 1.
In the general law of carriers in the United States, the rela-
tion of carrier and passenger is equally dependent on the existence
of a contract of carriage, but there need not necessarily be an ex-
press contract; the agreement may be implied from the circum-
stances of the particular case. If a person accepts a gratuitous ride
from a carrier, in good faith, he is considered a passenger and
entitled to the same degree of care for his safety and protection as
paying passengers. If he is wrongfully on the vehicle, the carrier
owes him no duty except not to injure him wantonly or wilfully.
"Death or Wounding of a Passenger or Any Other Bodily
Injury":
Since all the states of the Union now have wrongful death
statutes,3 7 no innovation is presented by this portion of Article 17.
In speaking of "other bodily injury suffered by a passenger," did
the drafters of the Convention have in mind the injury a passenger
may sustain through fright? Certainly, in the very nature of air
traffic, there is abundant opportunity for such cases to arise. The
characterization of the injury as bodily would not keep these cases
out, since in almost all cases of injury caused through fright, there
is a real physical disability suffered, such as extreme nervousness,
hemorrhage, miscarriage, traumatic neurasthenia, insanity, physical
injury consequent upon fainting, etc.38 In railroad cases, there is
an intimation that even if actual physical injury does not result,
recovery can be had for mere fright or mental suffering where
the carrier was guilty of wilful and wanton negligence.3 9 If this
view were carried over into the law of air carriers, recovery would
have to be permitted for fright occasioned by a pilot engaging in
acrobatic flying. The Convention, by the use of the word bodily
would be barred from following domestic law in this latter respect.
"If the Accident Took Place on Board the Aircraft, or in the
Course of Any of the Operations of Embarking or
Disembarking":
Such a provision illustrates the inherent difficulty of freezing
37. Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act (2d ed., 1913) Preface, xx.
38. See the collection of cases in Green, "Fright Cases," 27 Ill. L. Rev.
761 (1933), particularly the section dealing with passengers, p. 775.
39. See the opinion expressed in Hines v. Evans, 105 S. E. (Ga. App.) 59
(1920).
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into words the exact limitations of a law-to draw a line on one
side of which liability exists and is absent on the other.*° If the
line is too definitely drawn, in a matter which will always offer
widely varying circumstances, the rule becomes inflexible. If it is
too loosely gauged, the rule is ambiguous and its content must be
limited by many different judges who are called upon to construe it.
If we regard the Convention as a whole, we are safe in as-
suming that the intention was to limit its application to such time
that the passenger is exposed to dangers of aviation. An inter-
national convention is not necessary to govern the liability of an
air line company in its capacity as waiting-room proprietor, or
station-wagon operator.
This article states that the carrier is liable if the damage was
sustained while the passenger was on board the aircraft. This is
presumably so whether the plane is in flight or on the ground pre-
paratory for flight, or in any other position incidental to the pur-
pose of the contract of carriage. While this would take care of
the majority of cases, there is a fringe of possibilities which must
also be provided for. A passenger may be exposed to dangers of
aviation before he boards the plane, or after he alights from it.
4
1
To cover these cases, the somewhat vague expression "in the course
of 'any of the operations of embarking or disembarking" was used.
When do these begin and end? In the city of Chicago, it is com-
mon to purchase air transport tickets at an agency in the business
district and travel to the airport in a station wagon. The relation
of passenger and carrier exists from the time the ticket is bought;
at that time, new liabilities and rights exist between the parties.
But if injury were sustained in the course of transportation to the
airport, the nature of those rights and liabilities would be gov-
erned not by the Convention, but by local law, since the passenger
has not yet come into contact with the company in its capacity as
a carrier by air. That is a clear case. If the airport waiting-room
is maintained by the carrier, is an injury sustained therein by a
passenger within the terms of the Convention? The passenger is
present there for the purpose of embarkation. But again the pur-
pose of the Convention must be considered; no hazard peculiar
40. Compare the remarks of Justice Holmes In Schlesinger v. Wisconsin,
270 U. S. 230, 46 S. Ct. 260, 262 (1926) : "While I should not dream of asking
where the line can be drawn, since the great body of the law consists in draw-
ing such lines, yet when you realize that you are dealing with a matter of
degree you must realize that reasonable men may differ as to the place where
the line should fall."
41. In Curtiss Wright Fying Service, Inc. v. Williamson, - Tex. -,
51 S. W. (2d) 1047 (1932) a passenger, after the plane had landed with its
door an the far side from the hangar, walked to the front of the plane, under
the wing and fell into the revolving propeller.
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to air navigation has been encountered. To permit the air carrier
to limit his liability as a waiting-room operator would be a dis-
crimination against every operator of railway or bus passenger
stations.
Most large airports are managed so that passengers for a
particular plane are kept behind a gate until the ship is in position
and ready to be loaded. The gate is then opened and the passengers
walk to the plane. The very fact that ,a gate is used indicates that
particular hazards exist ahead. It is at this point that the passenger
passes from the custody of the waiting-room operator, to the cus-
tody of the person or corporation who is going to perform the con-
tract of carriage. This would seem then the logical place to draw
the line.
It must be remembered, however, that not all flights commence
at large airports so arranged. A passenger may board a plane at
an intermediate stop where no barriers exist between hangar and
landing field. This consideration, therefore, forbids stating the rule
in terms of station gates or other aspects of the physical situation
which would not be everywhere duplicated. 42
In the law of carriers in the United States, all the rights and
duties which flow from the passenger-carrier relation may exist at
the moment the person steps on the premises of the railroad-and
even though he has not yet purchased his ticket, although he has
the intention so to do.4 3
In General:
(1) Because of the use of the word "accident" in Article 17,
the Convention may be given a more restricted application than was
intended by its drafters. In Article 18, the word "occurrence"
(l'gvgnement) is used in the same relative position regarding the
transportation of goods. The latter term has a broader meaning
than the former. Accident connotes that which is unforeseen, un-
expected, undesigned. There is nothing in the preliminary dis-
cussions to indicate the intention to have the carrier's liability so
conditioned.
(2) Goedhuis raises the question 44 whether liability should
not be expressly limited to damages caused !as the result of, or in
42. The General Conditions of Transport of the I. A. T. A. provide (IA,
Article 7, par. 2): "(1) The presence of passengers upon the area of de-
parture or near aircraft is forbidden without the express permission of the
officials of the carrier. (2) Passengers must only enter or leave aircraft at
the request of such officials."
43. Central of Ga. lRy. v. Bell, 187 Ala. 541, 65 S. 835 (1914); Cooley
on Torts (4th ed., 1932) see. 465, p. 306, note 23.
44. Op. cit. p. 160.
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the course of transportation. In other words, Article 17 is broad
enough, on its face, to make the carrier liable for injury sustained
by two passengers engaging in mutual combat. It must be admitted
that the Convention does not specifically cover this point. The
only help the carrier would get from the Convention in such a
situation would be Article 20 (1) which exonerates him if'he has
taken all necessary measures. Whether this can be accepted as
completely reassuring is open to question. But the result in such a
case, in the hands of a competent court, would not be in doubt, since
the very purpose of the Convention is to take away the liability of
the carrier in situations where damage is caused without his fault.
This underlying purpose should have considerable weight in clarify-
ing some of the ambiguities of the Convention.
(3) It will be noticed that Article 17 does not extend the
period of transportation of passengers by air as far as Article 18
(2) does with respect to baggage or merchandise-"or, in the case
of ,a landing outside an airport, in any place whatever." This
provision was undoubtedly inserted to cover the situation where
goods are damaged after a forced landing is made, a circumstance
which would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the consignor
to prove just where the damage was sustained. Under similar
circumstances in the carriage of passengers, this difficulty would
not be encountered. If the passenger disembarked and walked
away from the aircraft, his passing out of the custody of the car-
rier breaks the continuance of the latter's responsibility.
Recommendations:
The expression "in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking" should be defined. It might be stated
that these operations commence, where embarkation takes place at
an airport operated with a restraining barrier for passengers about
to go aboard, when passage is made through such gate, and vice
versa, on disembarking, and that in other situations, such operations
shall be deemed to have commenced when the passenger is exposed
to the particular hazards of transportation by air.
The word "accident" should be replaced by the broader term
"occurrence." This substitution, it is believed, does not enlarge the
scope of the Convention beyond what was intended by the drafters.
Article 18. (1) The carrier shall be liable for damage
sustained in the event of the destruction or loss of, or of damage
to, any checked baggage or any goods, if the occurrence which
caused the damage so sustained took place during the transporta-
tion by air.
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(2) The transportation by air within the meaning of the
preceding paragraph shall comprise the period during which the
baggage or goods are in charge of the carrier, whether in an
airport or on board an aircraft, or, in the case of landing outside
an airport, in any place whatsoever.
(3) The period of the transportation by air shall not extend
to any transportation by land, by sea or by river performed out-
side an airport. If, however, such transportation takes place in
the performance of a contract for transportation by air, for the
purpose of loading, delivery or transshipment, any damage is
presumed, subject to proof to the contrary, to have been the
result of an event which took place during the transportation by
air.
Different considerations apply as to the period of time during
which the carrier should be liable for damage to goods, as con-
trasted with liability for damage to passengers-at what factual
stage potential liability attaches, and ends, or is suspended. For
one thing, when goods are in the custody of the carrier, they are
completely within his control. Secondly, once the consignor de-
livers goods to the carrier, the former has no means of establishing
at what particular time or under exactly what circumstances the
injury was sustained. Both of these considerations dictate that
the liability of the carrier attach upon delivery of the goods to him;
the responsibility not to end until delivery to the consignee. This
is particularly so where the contract of transportation is completed
by successive carriers. Notwithstanding these considerations, the
Convention adopts a different criterion in determining whether
the carrier is liable for injury to goods or baggage. It provides
that: (1) the goods or baggage must be in the custody of the
carrier, whether in an airport or on board an aircraft, or (2) ill
case of a landing outside an airport, in any place whatsoever.45
This formula makes possible a gap of non-liability at various
intermediate points in the performance -of a contract of transporta-
tion of goods. Suppose merchandise is being forwarded by air
express from Chicago to Mexico City, under one contract entered
into in Chicago between the consignor and a domestic carrier by
air who undertakes to transport the goods to El Paso and there
deliver them to another carrier for the balance of the distance.
Under Article 1 (2) and (3), the whole of this transaction comes
within the terms of the Convention (Mexico is a party by adher-
ence). Suppose that in El Paso, to effect the delivery from one air
carrier to the other, it is necessary to transport the goods by vehi-
45. It may be argued that this standard is the same as though the Con-
vention reaii, from the time the carrier takes possession until the time of de-
livery to the consignee. If this is the effect, it is difficult to see why
such wording was not used, from the standpoint of simplicity and ease of
administration.
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cle from one airport to another, and that in such operation the
goods are damaged. By both paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 18,
the liability for such damage (regardless of who the defendant
may be, the initial carrier, the transfer company if there is one,
or the second carrier) would not be governed by the Warsaw
Convention, notwithstanding that any liability incurred at any prior
or subsequent stage of the journey, would come within its terms.
Confusion would be the result: would the responsibility be gov-
erned by the law of Texas, where the injury took place, or the law
of Illinois, where the contract was entered into? "
It is also to be noticed that by the terms of Article 18, the
carrier's responsibility for damage to baggage or merchandise may
arise earlier in point of time than with respect to passengers. Bag-
gage checked in the airport waiting-room comes within the pro-
visions of the Convention at that moment, whereas the passenger
to whom such baggage belongs remains subject to domestic law
until he approaches the plane preparatory to embarkation. The
same is true in the opposite situation upon arrival at the point of
destination. 47
In paragraph (1) of this article, in stating that "the carrier
shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the destruction
or loss of, or of damage to, any checked baggage " the
drafters of the Convention overlook the fact that in Article 4, para-
graph (4), the statement is made that if the carrier accepts bag-
gage without a baggage check having been delivered, the carrier
shall not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of the
Convention which exclude or limit his liability. The latter pro-
vision would indicate that a carrier is responsible whether or not
baggage accepted is checked. In view of this, the limitation of
Article 18, paragraph (1), to checked baggage is misleading. What
was probably meant was baggage which the carrier takes into his
custody in the transportation of passengers, as distinguished from
articles which the passenger takes charge of himself.
Paragraph (3) of this article provides that where transporta-
tion by land, by sea, or river takes place in the performance of a
contract for transportation by air, any damage is presumed, subject
to proof to the contrary, to have been the result of an event which
46. Appreciate the further difficulties presented by the application to
this situation,of Article 30, discussed infra p. 50.
47. Note that the General Conditions of Transport, Article 19, par. (4).
make it one of the stipulations in contracts of transportation that the carrier
shall accept no responsibility in connection with surface transportation at
departure and destination, whatever may be the legal grounds upon which
any claim concerning any such liability may be based.
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took place during transportation by air. With a few hypothetical
cases, the meaning of this provision may be appreciated.
(1) If the air transport line operates its own pickup and
delivery service, it will be liable either under the Convention or at
common law, wherever the damage may have occurred. But wish-
ing to take advantage of the exemptions and limitations of the
Convention, the carrier will allow the presumption to stand, offering
no proof that damage really occurred in the course of delivery
service by land. The danger lies in the possibility that plaintiff
may have proof that the damage did in fact occur during trans-
portation by land.
(2) If the delivery or pickup service, taking place in the
performance of a contract for transportation by air, is performed
by someone other than the air transport line, and perhaps not in
privity of contract with it, and the goods have been damaged, the
air transport line will marshall its evidence to overcome the pre-
sumption that damage occurred during the transportation by air.
The danger lies in that it may be impossible to gather such con-
vincing evidence as to amount to proof of that fact.
Understanding that the Convention is directed to relieve the
carrier from responsibility for damage occasioned by the peculiar
danger incident to carriage by air, it is necessary to draw the line
between those activities properly within the scope of the Conven-
tion and 1hose for which the carrier should stand liability under
the ordinary common law rules, like every other transporter of
goods. But loading and delivery operations by land must neces-
sirily become an important adjunct to transportation by air. Again,
the line is difficult to draw.
A more conclusive method of handling this problem is found
in the C. I. M.,48 which provides that regular automobile or navi-
gation services which complete a journey by rail and carry inter-
national traffic under the responsibility of a connecting state or of a
railway may, by their own volition, make their undertakings sub-
ject to all the obligations and rights conferred on railways by the
Convention.4" If a similar provision were incorporated into the
Warsaw Convention, it would mean that an air carrier, operating
its own land delivery service, could invoke the protection of the
Convention, whether the damage occurred in transportation by air
or by land, and apart from its ability to prove or disprove exactly
where the damage was sustained. But the probability that this
48. Article 2, sees. 1 and 2.
49. "Subject to any rmodifications necessitated by differences in the meth-
ods of transport."
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
would be regarded by the courts as a discrimination against other
carriers by land must be recognized.
In the United States, the carrier becomes liable as such upon
the. delivery of goods into his custody for immediate shipment, and
regardless of the carrier placing the goods in a warehouse pending
shipment, he is still liable as carrier. But where the carrier holds
goods at the request of or for the accommodation of the shipper,
his liability is that of a warehouseman, responsible only for ordi-
nary care.50
Article.19. The carrier shall be liable for damage occasioned
by delay in the transportation by air of passengers, baggage or
goods.
M. Goedhuis points out 5' that liability for delay was objected
to strongly by the I. A. T. A., but that the authors of the Conven-
tion believed it would be illogical that in a mode of transportation
which is supposed to be extra fast, passengers could not complain
of delay.52
But this provision is not a wide open source of liability. The
plaintiff, to make out his case, must show:
(1) That there was, in fact, a delay-a departure from sched-
uled time, or, if time of departure and arrival were not scheduled,
that the transportation took an unreasonable length of time. In the
General Conditions of. Transport prescribed by the I. A. T. A.53
it is stipulated that "carriers do not guarantee the carriage or de-
livery of goods within a definite time except by special agreement
incorporated in the air consignment note." And in connection
with passengers and baggage, these same conditions provide:51
"the time tables of carriers furnish indications of average time
without these being in any way guaranteed." Such stipulations in
the contract may make it impossible to prove the fact of delay.,"
(2) That the delay occurred during "transportation by air."
50. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Knight, 122 U. S. 79, 7 S. Ct. 1132 (1887).
51. Op. cit., p. 166.
52. Procs Verbaux, p. 37.
53. 1B, Article 9.
54. IA. Article 19, par. 1, (2).
55. Airlines in the United States make similar stipulations. The time
tables of Northwest Airlines state: "Schedules show the time at which planes
may be expected to arrive at and depart from stations, and to connect with
other planes or trains, but the company will not be responsible for conse-
quences arising from delays or from errors in the printed schedule. The time
shown is subject to change without notice."
Those of Pennsylvania Airlines provide: "These time tables show the
time at which planes may be expected to depart from and arrive at the several
stations shown and to connect with trains or other planes, but their departure,
arrival or connection at the time stated Is not guaranteed. Pennsylvania Air-
lines and Transport Company will not be responsible for errors or omissions
in time tables, inconvenience or damage resulting from delays to planes or
failure to make connections and also reserves the right to vary from the times
shown, without notice to the public. All schedules, fares and information sub-
ject to change without notice," The Official Aviation Guide, May, 1935.
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This is ambiguous. The absence of a supplementary clause, such
as that in Article 18 (2), explaining what is embraced by this ex-
pression, may imply a strict limitation to delay taking place while
the plane is in flight. Such an interpretation is highly unreasonable,
almost absurd. Delay is almost certain to occur not while the
plane is in flight but during a postponed departure, or during need-
less landings, or landings necessary because of the negligent care of
the plane, etc.
(3) That as the result of such delay the plaintiff suffered
damages. The limitation on the carrier's liability for damage
caused by delay is, by Article 22, 250 francs per kilogram in the
case of goods, and 125,000 francs as to passengers.
If the plaintiff can show all of the above, the carrier may
nevertheless avoid all liability if he can make proof according to
Article 20, the exemptive provisions of which present a formidable
obstacle to any recovery. Their effect will be discussed later in
this article.
Alternative theories of liability may be considered: In the
United States it may be generally stated that a carrier is liable
only for such delay as arises through its negligence, and when
injury is caused thereby. The law implies an undertaking to de-
liver within a reasonable time. 56 This is essentially the same stand-
ard of liability imposed by the Warsaw Convention.
That provided by the C. I. M. is also similar: "The railway
shall be liable . . . for any damage caused through delay in de-
livery. . . . The railway shall not be responsible for damage re-
sulting from delay in delivery, if it can prove that the delay was
occasioned by circumstances outside its control. '5T But the measure
of recovery is specifically set out: if the plaintiff is unable to prove
the damages suffered as the result of the delay, the railway is
obliged to pay a proportion of the cost of carriage, increasing with
the duration of the delay, up to a maximum of 50% of the cost of
carriage. For example, a delay not exceeding one-tenth of the
period allowed entitles the plaintiff to recover one-tenth of the
cost of carriage. But where proof is adduced of loss resulting
from the delay, compensation not exceeding the cost of carriage
may be recovered.58 It has been pointed out that this machinery
is advantageous both to the carrier and shipper; to the former
because it permits him to foresee exactly the maximum extent of
his potential liability, and to the latter because it relieves him from
56. 10 C. J. 283, 831.
57. Article 27, sections 1 and 3.
58. Article 33.
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the burden of proving the elements of his damages in every case.
It is believed, however, that there is an element of unfairness in
this method. Where lines are operated under competitive condi-
tions, sufficient inducements exist to run on scheduled time; in the
infrequent cases of unreasonable delay, damages should be required
to be specifically proven. Possibly, an automatic sliding scale of
damages such as that authorized in the C. I. M. would be appro-
priate where carriers are government owned and are operated
under monopoly conditions. In such cases, the recovery savors
of a penalty rather than compensation.
Article 20. (1) The carrier shall not be liable If he proves
that he and his agents have takern all necessary measures to
avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to
take such measures.
(2) In the transportation of goods and baggage the carrier
shall not be liable if he proves that the damage was occasioned
by an error in piloting, in the handling 6f the aircraft or in navi-
gation and that, in all other respects, he and his agents have
taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage. 59
In General:
Reaching Article 20, we come to the heart of the Convention.
Here is the means by which the carrier can avoid responsibility
altogether. In discussing this article, it is necessary to make some
assumption as to the desirability of giving the air carrier a special
and more lenient measure of liability than other carriers. If one is
of the view that such leniency should not be extended and that the
air transport industry should be subjected to the same degree of
responsibility as carriers by land, a view which was forcefully
defended by the Soviet delegation, 0 the whole structure of Arti--
cle 20 must be redesigned. The writer has chosen, rather, the
assumption that limited, liability is logically and economically de-
sirable-logically, in part because of the special treatment ship-
owners have received for reasons which apply with equal force
to air line companies,6 1 and economically because the trend of
opinion is toward the encouragement of the aviation industry's de-
59. In two respects, the form of Article 20 may lead to some confusion.
First, by dividing the article into two paragraphs and making the second
applicable to the transportation of goods and baggage, it is possible to Jump
to the conclusion that paragraph (1) applies only to the transportation of
passengers; to avoid this interpretation, the insertion at the beginning of
paragraph (2) of the words "In addition," or "Furthermore," would be helpful.
Second, at the end of paragraph (2), the words found at the end of the first
paragraph, "or that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures,"
have been omitted. No reason Is seen for this omission, Goedhuis (p. 192) lists
this as one of the matters to be considered upon revision of the Convention.
60. Procs Verbaux, p. 26.
61. For example, the fact that when a catastrophe occurs to plane or
ship, usually the entire investment of the owner is absolutely lost.
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velopment-witness the liberality of government subsidies, munici-
pal construction and maintenance of airports, etc. 62
That limitation of liability is only one method of relieving the
burden must be recognized. M. Kaftal advocates a system of ab-
solute liability coupled with compulsory insurance. 63 Such a system
has its advantages: The person damaged is entitled to compensa-
tion regardless of such immaterial factors as how the accident oc-
curred; the time and expense of litigation is dispensed with; losses
are apportioned over the industry as a whole.
Accepting the basic principle of Article 20 as representative of
the views of the majority of the delegates, we concern ourselves
only with its interpretation.
Agents:
The word "agent" has been translated from the French
proposg, which has the meaning of "officer," or "person in charge."
It does not have the legal meaning that "agent" has, of one in the
position of a proxy, or one who contracts with third parties on
behalf of a principal. For this reason the word "servant" may be
,a more correct translation, as the latter term includes all.who act
under the authority and direction of another.
Necessary Measures:
The use of the word "necessary" in connection with the meas-
ures to be taken by the carrier may be productive of some con-
fusion in Anglo-American courts where the standard of "rea-
sonableness" has always been used. "Necessary measures" con-
notes everything required to prevent the accident; "reasonable
measures" leaves room for recognition of the fact that human
foresight and judgment can never be infallible. The word "reason-
able" was used in the preliminary drafts64 and the substitution of
the word "necessary" was proposed by the Soviet delegate.2
The taking of necessary measures is an extremely wide term."6
62. Great Britain was the chief advocate of limited liability in the pre-
liminary discussions. Proc~s Verbaux, p. 29.
63. Andre Kaftal, "Liability and Insurance," 5 Air L. Rev. 157 (1934).
See the resolution proposed by M. Kaftal and adopted by the International
Air Congress meeting at The Hague in 1930, which recommends the study by
the CiteJa .9f insurance methods to be used in conjunction with the Warsaw
Convention, 14 Droit Adrien 740 (1930). See, also, Robert Homburg, "Com-
pulsory Aviation Insurance," 4 Air Law Rev. 274 (1933).
64. See Compte Rendu, Citeja, 3rd Session, p. 47.
65. Procs Verbaux, pp. 26, 136. At another point it was intimated by
the Swiss delegate that while "reasonable measures" may have a precise mean-
ing in England, it conveys no thought whatever, elsewhere. Page 31.
66. Must these phrases necessarily be condemned because they do not
have a crystal-clear meaning? Compare the vagueness of other highly im-
portant concepts In the law-act of God, due process, due care-and the
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Different courts in different countries are bound to have variant
ideas as to what is contained in this requirement. Will it be satis-
fied if the carrier proves that proper inspection was made of the
plane before it left the aerodrome ?e7 Or that the pilot and co-pilot
hold proper licenses?"' If it means that the carrier must, in his
proof, follow the course of the plane up to the time of the accident
and prove that in all that time he and his agent had taken all the
proper steps to avoid the accident, or that it was impossible so to
do, his burden is heavy indeed.69 While this article does not ex-
pressly require the carrier to ascertain the cause of the accident,
a strict interpretation of this article would indirectly do so, since
the nature of the accident would determine the extent of defend,
ant's proof. For example, if a crash was caused by ice forming
on the wings, the carrier would not have to prove that the motor
was functioning properly; he would have to prove the taking of
necessary measures regarding such ice formation, however. To be
adequately prepared to give the necessary proof, he should know
the cause. Without such knowledge, he would evidently have to
run the whole gamut of possible causes and show that he had
taken necessary measures with respect to each.
Impossible to Take Necessary Measures:
Somewhere in these exemptive provisions must be found the
analogy of vis major, force majeure, act of God, inevitable acci-
tenacity with which they persist as Instrumentalities In the judging process.
See Green, Judge and Jury (1930) p. 179.
67. In this regard, see Curtiss-Wright, Inc. v. Glose, 66 F. (2d) 710(1933). wherein the deceased, the sole passenger in a flight from Miami to
Tampa, and the pilot were killed when the plane crashed In an attempted
landing on a small private field. The court said:
"That the plane was in good order, supplied with proper equipment,fuel, etc., is clear. The mishap, therefore, cannot be attributed t6 any
equipment cause but rather to an operative one. Was there evidence
of lack of due conduct on the pilot's part?"
Thereupon, the court, after considering what the pilot might have done to
avoid the accident, concluded there was evidence from which the jury could
infer negligence on defendant's part. In other words, conceding that the
carrier was free from fault prior to the departure of the plane, he must be
able to show the exercise of due diligence by his employee right up to the time
of the accident.
But ef. Allison v. Standard Air Lines, 65 F. (2d) 668 (1933). The pas-
senger was killed when the plane crashed into a mountain in foggy weather.
By virtue of the defendant's testimony that it maintained a systematic method
for checking of all planes prior to flight, that the plane in question was so
checked and found in good condition, that the pilot was employed for a time
sufficient to be familiar with the route, the court held that there was suffi-
cient evidence to support a verdict for the defendant.
68. Goedhuis intimates (op. cit. 186) that proof by the carrier of exer-
cising reasonable diligence in choosing his employees, and in their supervision,
would not be allowed.
In The Fort Morgan, 274 F. 734 (1921), affmd. 284 F. 1, the owner of a
ship stranded through negligence in navigation, was obliged to show the exer-
cise of due care in the selection of navigation officials and engine-room force
to secure the protection of the Harter Act.
69. The Harter Act (46 U. S. C. A. 192) provides that the vessel owner's
liability will be limited only if he proves that he exercised due diligence to
make the vessel seaworthy and properly manned. This all relates to what
took place before departure.
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dent, dangers of the sea, etc. Why any of these expressions is not
used is not clear. Perhaps the reason is that these phrases have
acquired in different systems of law a wealth of connotation which
it would be impossible to harmonize for purposes of a code de-
signed for universal application.
In proving that it was impossible for him or his agents to take
necessary measures, the carrier exempts himself from responsibility
for damage caused by act of God, act of the public enemy. But
the necessary measures concept is wider than that. For example,
an accident caused by motor failure could not be viewed as an act
of God. The latter phrase means something exterior, unforeseeable,
irresistible. But by proving that regulation tests were made of
the motor, that its operation was checked immediately before the
flight, etc., the carrier has proved that necessary measures have
been taken. The possibility exists that carriers will escape lia-
bility under Article 20 in situations where they would have been
liable under the act of God formula.7 0
This wider field of exemption, however, may be balanced by
the difficulty of proving necessary measures. M. Goedhuis believes
the proof required by Article 20 is more difficult than to prove
vis major, having in mind the cases wherein the real cause of the
damage cannot be discovered. 7'1 If many airplanes crash without
the cause being ascertainable, this may be true. But in the analysis
of causes of accidents compiled by the Bureau of Air Commerce,
in the year 1933 only 3.77% of the total were classified as unde-
termined or doubtful, and in 1934, none was so classified.
Error in Piloting:
In addition, the carrier of goods and merchandise is not liable
if he can prove that the damage was caused by an error of piloting,
of navigation, or in the handling of the aircraft. At the insistence
of the German delegate, the Convention does not provide this
avenue of escape in the transportation of passengers; it was con-
tended that if this source of responsibility were taken away, there
would be nothing left on which a passenger could hope for re-
covery.7 2 This means there is a greater range of non-liability with
respect to goods, than as to passengers. In this respect, the Article
differs from the common law of the United States which makes the
carrier an insurer of merchandise carried but requires him only to
70. See Andrd Kaftal, "Liability and Insurance," 5 Air L. Rev. 267, 268
(1934).
71. Op. cit., p. 193.
72. Procas Verbaux, p. 30.
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use due care in the transportation of passengers, and the burden
of proof lies with the plaintiff.73 In interstate commerce, this has
been modified by the Hepburn Act :7 the carrier of goods has been
relieved of his common law liability as insurer; the loss must be
attributable to some breach of duty or default on his part.75
Goedhuis points out 76 that the original source of this exemp-
tion is to be found in the Harter Act.7 7  The cases 'construing this
provision of the Harter Act may be illuminative as to the practical
effect of this exemption. They indicate that the purpose of the
Act in this respect is to relieve the owner of the ship, who is other-
wise without fault, from the consequences of the acts of his em-
ployees in charge of and operating his vessel,"S-in a sense a partial
abrogation of the rule of respondeat superior. In the discussions
of the C. I. T. E. J. A. on the preliminary draft, the view was
expressed that these terms extended only to the acts of the com-
mander, pilot and navigator. But this cannot be viewed as a
binding or necessarily exclusive interpretation. Goedhuis ques-
tions what the application of these terms would be if the accident
were caused through the fault of the radio operator. A logical
interpretation would be that they embrace the acts of anyone en-
gaged in the piloting, the navigation or the handling of the plane,
regardless of their designated capacity.
How wide these exemptive provisions are may be guessed at
from an examination of the Bureau of Air Commerce analysis of
causes of accidents occurring in scheduled air-transport services for
the half-yearly periods of 1933 and 1934.7 0
73. Hutclison on Carriers, Vol. II, see. 892. This Is based on the theory
that the bailor of goods rarely could know how the injury to his control oc-
curred. The application of this theory to modern transportation law has been
criticized: "Once within the carrier's vehicle, the passenger entrusts his safety
to the carrier as fully as a consignee of goods. A passenger has no greaterknowledge of the manner in which the train which contains his goods Is oper-
ated." F. Ff. Bohlen, "Aviation Under the Common Law" (1934) 46 Harv.
L. Rev. 216.
74. 49 U. S. C. A. 20.
75. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 33 S. Ct. 148 (1918)Atlantic Coast Line R. v. Sandlin, 75 Fla. 539, 78 S. 667 (1918). This act applies
only to interstate commerce by railroad or water. It would not apply to air
transportation.
76. Op. cit., p. 190.
77. 46 U. S. C. A. sec. 192: "If the owner of any vessel transporting
merchandise or property shall exercise due diligence to make the said vessel
seaworthy and properly manned, equipped and supplied, neither the vessel norher owner shall be held responsible for damage or loss resulting from faults
or errors In navigation or in the management of said vessel, nor from losses
arising from dangers of the sea, acts of God, or inherent defect of the thing
carried .... "
This act does not apply in the transportation of passengers by sea, the
carrier remaining liable for the exercise of due care, recovery In case of deathbeing limited only to a "fair and just compensation." 46 U. S. C. A. 761, 762.78. The Milwaukee Bridge, 15 F. (2d) 249 (1926) (failure to jettisonleaking drums of sulphuric acid whereby other cargo was damaged; held, afault in management for which the vessel was not liable). The Sylvia, 171
U. S. 462. 19 S. Ct. 7 (1898) ; The Sadfleld 92 F. 663 (1898) ; .Manegolk v.The P. A. Shores, Jr.. 73 F. 342 (1896).
79. Air Commerce Bulletin, Vols. V, VI.
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(1) Accidents caused by errors of judgment, poor technique
or negligence of the pilot constituted from 13% to 41% of the total
number of accidents for that period: In this group, the carrier
could rely on the error-in-piloting provision to escape liability in
the transportation of merchandise. 0  If the accident occurred in
the carriage of passengers, the carrier would be obliged to prove
that he had taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage, or
that it was impossible to do so.
(2) Accidents caused by weather ("conditions which could
not reasonably have been foreseen and avoided") ranged in per-
centage from 14 to 27. Under the necessary-measures clauses of
Article 20, this category should mean complete non-liability for the
carrier.
(3) Accidents due to mechanical causes, such as power plant
failures, undercarriage, handling qualities, instruments, etc., com-
prised from 30% to 49% of the total number of accidents. This
group could be broken down, from a liability standpoint, into the
following:
(a) Inherent defects, errors of design or engineering, de-
fective materials. Whatever is here embraced points to ultimate lia-
bility on the part of the manufacturer.8'
.(b) Conditions developing through use of the plane and
ordinarily discoverable by usual methods of inspection, e. g., weak-
ening of undercarriage, of wearing surfaces, improper lubrication,
etc. In this class, the carrier would find it difficult to prove that
he had taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage. 2(c) Structural or mechanical failures which develop in spite
of the taking of all necessary measures (assuming that there is a
standard of reasonableness in the use of the word "necessary").
80. If the error were committed by an inexperienced pilot, and traceable
to such Inexperience, the carrier could not prove that "in all other respects.
he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage."
Cf. Ziser v. Colonial Western Airways, 10 N. J. 1118, 162 Atl. 591 (1932) (the
court held the jury was entitled to find negligence on the ground, among
others, that the carrier had intrusted the plane to a pilot new to the locality).81. No provision is made in the Convention for damage caused by inher-
ent defects in the aircraft itself, but up to the time of the conference at which
the Convention was adopted, Article 20 (1) read: "The carrier shall not be
liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures
to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such
measures, unless tho damage occurred through an inherent defect in the air-
craft." The omission of the last phrase was advocated by the British and
French delegates, and after an extended discussion, was adopted. The Swiss
delegate, In opposing this omission, criticized drawing an analogy to maritime
law, and contended that when an accident was caused through inherent defect,
the passenger should have his remedy against the carrier, who then might go
against the manufacturer. Proc~s Verbaux, p. 31.
82. Ci. Bole v. Colonial Western Airways, Inc., 110 N. J. Law 76, 164
At. 436 (1932)-(by virtue of testimony that on: the next previous flight the
engines of the plane had not worked well, the court declared that the use of
the plane after an opportunity to observe its defective operation, without ade-
quate repair, would be some evidence of negligence).
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(4) Accidents due to the condition of the airport or terrain
("conditions which could not reasonably have been detected or
avoided") ranged up to 14%. These accidents should mean in
large part no liability on the part of the carrier by virtue of the
necessary-measures provisions, or possibly the error-in-piloting
clause.
83
(5) Accidents due to causes undetemined or doubtful-In the
period from July to December, 1933, the percentage was 3.77. In
all the other periods, no accidents were so classified. This per-
centage represents two out of one hundred and seventy-four acci-
dents, and is small enough to be almost insignificant; it points to
the fact that accidents in which no evidence can be gathered as to
why they occurred will be very few indeed.
As mentioned above, the exemption provided by the error-in-
piloting clause applies only in the transportation of baggage and
merchandise, and not of passengers. This special treatment de-
serves some explanation. The British delegate, chief proponent of
this feature, pointed to this exemption in maritime law where it was
invoked because "maritime operations are of a nature so difficult, so
delicate, that everyone agreed it was not fair to impose upon ship-
owners responsibility for the faults committed by the captain of the
vessel. . . . My government [Great Britain] has recommended that
I urge with all possible energy the adoption of this amendment [to
provide the error-in-piloting exemption in the transportation of pas-
sengers as well as goods and baggage] because it appears that the
responsibility imposed on the carrier is altogether too heavy.", 4  In
proposing that this amendment should not apply to'the transporta-
tion of passengers, the Italian delegate said it was a matter of
humanitarian policy1 5 This viewpoint must carry -some weight.
When it is a question of the destruction or damage of a commodity,
the consignor can be considered to have undertaken one of the
speculations that attend all business transactions; if he has insured
himself against this loss, there is, in almost every case, a complete
recompense. But this reasoning has no validity in the carriage of
passengers; human life or bodily injury cannot be treated in terms
83. Consider the case of McCusker v. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc.,
269 Ill. App. 502 (1933). The pilot was killed and the plaintiff, the only
passenger, was injured in an attempted landing of the plane on an emergency
landing field. The only basis for a negligence finding was the pilot's failure
to use a flare; this, the court held, was sufficient to support a verdict. This
view of the court, translated into the necessary-measures language of the
Convention. would likewise mean recovery for the plaintiff. The error-In-
piloting exemption would not have any bearing, since it is a case of transporta-
tion of a passenger.
84. Proc~s Verbaux, pp. 29, 31.
85. Procis Verbaux, p. 33.
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of dollars and cents. Underlying this, of course, is the assumption
that a greater measure of liability will promote greater care on the
part of the carrier.
Defendant's Burden of Proof:
In bringing his action, the plaintiff need only allege the hap-
pening of the accident, the injury or loss sustained, the circum-
stances bringing the accident within the terms of the Convention ;8O
by doing so he has made out a prima facie case. It is not neces-
sary, as in the ordinary tort action, to allege specific acts of neg-
ligence on the part of the defendant, nor that plaintiff was free
from contributory negligence.8 7  The burden then devolves upon
the carrier to prove that he and his agents had taken all necessary
measures to avoid the damage, or that it was impossible for him
or them to take such measures. This is a burden of proving
affirmatively the carrier's freedom from fault. This burden of
proof is strongly suggestive of that employed by the maxim res
ipsa loquitur.
The maxim is used in two types of situations. First, where
the causes of the accident are within the exclusive or predominant
knowledge of the defendant so that he alone can adequately show
what brought it about. And second, where the accident is one which
would be almost impossible, or at least extremely unlikely, to hap-
pen in the absence of negligence, an accident which, in the light of
common experience, justifies the conclusion that defendant has
been negligent. In the first situation, there is ample justification
for using the maxim; this is indicated in the case of, Wilson v.
Colonial Air Transport, Inc.8  The court stated that because there
was no evidence to show by whom mechanical inspections were
made, it was not established that all the circumstances were in the
sole control of the defendant or his servants, that therefore the
maxim could not be applied. But res ipsa loquilur has also been
used in air carrier cases in the second sense. Smith v. O'Donnell85
86. At first thought It might seem that It is a matter for the defendant
to plead that the Convention applies, in view of Its limiting and exemptive
provisions, in his favor. But to have the case brought within the terms of
the Warsaw Rules may be just as attractive to the plaintiff: he may be unable
to allege specific acts of negligence committed by the defendant; he may, as a
gratuitous passenger, to whom no ticket was Issued, have a better chance of
recovering under the Convention than he would by local law (see discussion
in this regard, p. 18) ; he may not be able to prove himself free from con-
tributory negligence and wish to shift that burden to the defendant; in all
cases, It is to the advantage of the plaintiff to found his action on the
Convention.
87. Article 21 provides that the carrier has the burden of proving the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff. See discussion infra.
88. 278 Mass. 420. 180 N. E. 212 (1932).
89. - Cal. App. -, 5 P. (2d) 690 (1930) ; aff'd 215 Cal. 714, 12 P. (2d)
933 (1932).
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"If the proper degree of care is used, a collision in midair does
not ordinarily occur, and for that reason the doctrine was properly
submitted to the jury."
The burden of proof principle imposed by the Convention
is similar to the use of the maxim in the first sense. The carrier is
in a better position to know the cause of the accident and assemble
proof of his exercise of due care than the plaintiff is to prove that
the defendant was negligent.90
Recommendations:
(1) The word "agents" should be replaced by "servants" or
"employees" to give a clearer meaning to the article in Anglo-
American courts.
(2) There should be inserted at the end of paragraph (2),
for purposes of consistency with paragraph (1), "or that it was im-
possible for him or them to take such measures."
(3) New considerations should be given to the desirability of
a specific treatment of accidents caused through faults of design
or manufacture. These cases, which according to Bureau of Air
Commerce statistics form a considerable proportion of the total
number of accidents, cannot adequately be handled by the neces-
sary-measures formula.
Article 21. If the carrier proves that the damage was caused
by or contributed to by the negligence of the injured person the
Court may, in accordance with the provisions of its own law,
exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his liability.
This article places the burden of proving the contributory
negligence of the injured person upon the carrier; this is the gen-
eral rule in the United States0 ' although there is authority to the
contrary. 2  Also, according to this article, the effect of contribu-
tory negligence of the injured person upon the liability of the car-
rier-whether it will exonerate him wholly or only in part, is to be
determined by the lex fori.8  In the United States it is generally
held that even though the carrier be negligent, if the injury was
90. If a plane crashed, killing the operators as well as passengers, is
there any knowledge exclusively in possession of the defendant? Possibly,
yes. The carrier's mechanical experts would be better able to abstract some
evidence from the wreckage than the plaintiff would.
91. Indianapolis . St. Louis R. Co. V. Horst, 93 U. S. 291, 23 L. Ed. 208
(1876); Texas & P. Ry. Go. v. Gardner, 114 F.o186 (C. C. A. 6th, 1902).
92. Hewes v. Chi. d. Eastern Illinois R. Co., 119 Ill. App. 393 (1905).
aff'd 217 Ill. 500; Randall v. Sterling, Dixon, etc., Ry. Co., 158 Il1. App. 56
(1910).
93. Under the C. I. V. (passengers by rail), art. 28, this question would
be solved by resorting to the lex loci rather than the lex fort.
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contributed to by the passenger's contributory fault, recovery is
completely defeated. 4
It is also to be noted that there is a well-settled rule that the
contributory negligence of an injured passenger will not shield the
carrier from liability where the latter's conduct has been marked
by gross or wilful negligence. Article 25 of the Convention pro-
vides that the carrier may not avail himself of the provisions which
exclude or limit his liability if the damage is caused by his wilful
misconduct. If there is a question whether Article 21 is such' a
provision which "excludes or limits" the carrier's liability within
the meaning of Article 25, the courts of the United States would
undoubtedly answer the question in the affirmative, in view of the
rule hereinabove stated.
Article 22. (1) In the transportation of passengers the lia-
bility of the carrier for each passenger shall be limited to the
sum of 125,000 francs. Where, in accordance with the law of the
Court to which the case is submitted, damages may be awarded
In the form of periodical payments, the equivalent capital value
of said payments shall not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless,
by special contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a
higher limit of liability.
(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods,
the liability of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs
per kilogram, unless the consignor has made, at the time when
the package was handed over to the carrier, a special declaration
of the value at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum if the
case so requires. In that case the carrier will be liable to pay a
sum not exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves that that
sum is greater than the actual value to the consignor at delivery.
(3) As regards objects of which the passenger takes charge
himself the liability of the carrier shall be limited to 5000 francs
per passenger.
(4) The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to
the French franc consisting of 656 milligrams of gold at the
standard of fineness of nine hundred thousandths. These sums
may .be converted into any national currency in round figures.
In terms of American dollars, computing the franc at its par
of 6.63 cents,9 5 the liability of the carrier for each passenger is
limited to $8,287.50; for checked baggage and goods $7.51 per
pound; for objects which the passenger takes care of himself
$331.50 per passenger. It should be observed that the maximum
amount for passengers is considerably lower than what is usually
recovered in death cases in the United States.9"
1
94. Coburn v. Phil. W. & B. 1. Co., 198 Pa. 436 48 A. 265 (1901) ; Carter
v. Seaboard Airline RB. Co., 165 N. C. 244, 81 S. E. 321 (1914) ; Waterbury v.
C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 104 Ia. 32, 73 N. W. 341 (1897).
95. This is the franc established by law of 1928. The interesting dis-
cussion of the delegates regarding this article will be found in Procs Verbaux,
p. 60.
96. Boele v. Colonial Western Airways, 10 N. J. Misc. 217, 158 A. 440
(1932) (verdict of $38,000 to wife of deceased, reduced to $25,000) ; Henderson
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Different methods of converting the limit of liability into terms
of other national currencies suggest themselves. In the English
Carriage by Air Act0 which gives effect to the Convention within
the United Kingdom, it is provided that the sums mentioned in
francs in Article 22 shall, in any action against the carrier, be con-
verted into sterling at the rate of exchange prevailing on the date
on which the amount of any damages to be paid by the carrier is
ascertained by the court. Such an interpretation recommends itself
from the standpoint of simplicity. If current rate of exchange is
adopted, however, strict logic would require that the rate prevailing
it the time the injury was sustained be adopted rather than that at
the time judgment is entered. This is fundamental in the law of
damages-that the elements of damage, e. g., earning power, mar-
ket price of commodities, and so forth, must be determined as of
the time that the injury occurred. By Article 29, two years delay
may take place before action is begun; it may be another year
before judgment is entered in the case. This makes the amount of
recovery too greatly dependent upon fluctuation in international
exchange.
But an entirely different method is possible, namely, to use
the gold parity existing between the franc and the particular cur-
rency into which the sum is to be translated; e. g., the franc cre-
ated by the law of June 25, 1928, represents, at par, .0663 in terms
of the American dollar. By this method, the expression of the
American equivalent would be fixed, from the time that the Con-
vention becomes effective in the United States, and would not
fluctuate during the time that it is in force with the ups and downs
of a foreign national currency, in this case the French franc. This
interpretation, on a gold parity basis, is bolstered by the reference
in paragraph (4) to the gold content of the present franc. The
handling of this problem in the Brussels Convention, in which the
limit of liability is expressed in terms of pounds sterling, is similar
to what has been done in the English Carriage by Air Act, above
referred to. Express provision is made that "national laws may
reserve to the debtor the right of discharging his debt in national
currency according to the rate of exchange prevailing on the day of
v. Colonial Western Airways, 10 N. J. Misc. 217, 159 A. 440 (1932-verdict
of $33.900 to mother of deceased reduced to $15,000) ; Ziser v. Colonial Western
Airways, 10 N. J. Misc. 1118. 162 A. 591 (1932-verdict of $46,000 to wife of
deceased reduced to $25,000) ; Conklin v. Canadian Colonial Airways, 271 N. Y.
Supp. 1107 (1934-$75,274 to wife of deceased reduced to $25,000); Curtiss-
Wright Flying Service, Inc. V. Williamson, 51 S. W. (2d) 1047 (Tex., 1932)(verdict of $25,000 to wife and children affirmed) ; McCusker v. Curtiss-Wright
Flying Service, Inc., 269 I1. App. 502 (1933-$10,000 to injured passenger).
97. 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, sec. 1(5).
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the arrival of the ship at the port of discharge of the goods con-
cerned."98s
By the Harter Act, the shipowner's liability as to property loss
or damage is limited to the value of the interest of the owner in the
vessel;O9 for the death of a passenger, "the recovery shall be a fair
and just compensation." 100  The Interstate Commerce Act con-
tains no express limit of liability. By the Brussels Convention,
Article 1, the shipowner's liability is measured by the value of the
vessel, freight and accessories, with an additional provision that
in case of death or bodily injury of passengers, the shipowner is
liable in an amount exceeding this limit up to £8 per ton of the
vessel's tonnage. The C. I. M., like the Warsaw Convention,
adopts the weight of the merchandise lost or damaged as a measure
for the carrier's limit of liability.101
The fixing of a maximum limit of recovery for one injured in
the transportation of goods or passengers by air is not a legal
problem at all, but must be decided upon after giving consideration
to a number of economic, technical, and social factors. Assuming
that limited liability is desirable, viewpoints will differ as to where
that limit should be placed. Airline operators will want to see it
as low as practicable. The passengers and shippers, who of course
have no collective voice, would, contend that the limit be high
enough to permit a compensatory recovery. Between these two
opposites, a compromise can never be a fair one, either to the car-
rier, or to the passenger or shipper.10 2
Paragraphs (1) and (2) provide that, as to both passengers
and goods, a higher limit of liability may be set by special agree-
ment of the parties. This would usually be attended by the pay-
ment of an additional sum. But it should be noted that by such
a special contract, there is no assurance that the higher sum will be
paid. In the case of goods, Article 22 (2), the carrier is permitted
to prove that the declared sum "is greater than the actual value to
the consignor at delivery. °1 0 3  In cases of injury or death to a
98. Article 9. Cf. C. I. M. and C. I. V., Article 56.
99. 46 U. S. C. A. 182.
100. 46 U. S. C. A. 761.
101. C. I. M., Art. 29 et seq.
102. Andrd Kaftal, "Liability and Insurance," 5 Air L. Rev. 157 (1934).
103. Regarding this clause, M. Goedhuls states, "considering that the declara-
tion [of special interest] has precisely for its object the obtaining of a re-
covery additional or supplementary to the objective value of the merchandise,
this object is made almost illusory by the provision in the second sentence"
[whereby the carrier can show actual value is less than- declared value] : Op.
cit., p. 214. This is not altogether true in every case. Instances where a
special declaration of value is made because the actual value of the mer-
chandise, per pound, is greater than the limit provided, would probably be
more numerous than those instances where a special declaration is made be-
cause subjective value is greater than actual value.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
passenger, while the probabilities are that a jury could be con-
vinced that plaintiff was injured to the extent of the sum set oy
special contract, the carrier could insist, as a matter of law, that
plaintiff's recovery be limited to compensation.
Regarding paragraph (3) of this article, M. Goedhuis asks
why such a provision is made, since articles in the possession and
control of a passenger and for which no transportation document
is issued, would not seem to come within the scope of this Con-
vention. The General Conditions of Transport of the I. A. T. A.
expressly state :104 "The passenger is entirely responsible for the
supervision of articles which he takes charge of himself. The car-
rier accepts nq responsibility for the supervision of such articles
even if his employees assist in loading, unloading or transshipping
them."
Article 23. Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of
liability or to fix a lower limit than that which is laid down in
.this Convention shall be null and void, but the nullity of any such
provision shall not involve the nullity of the whole contract,
which shall remain subject to the provisions of this Convention.
The first clause of this article must be interpreted to mean lia-
bility as laid down by the Convention for carriage by 'air, inasmuch
as there is a wide field of liability of' the carrier outside of and
entirely unaffected by the Convention, e. g., ground transportation
by the carrier supplementary to transportation by air. The validity
of provisions relieving the carrier from such responsibility would
be determined by national law. Such provisions are to be found
in the General Conditions of Transport of the I. A. T. A.105
In interstate commerce in the United States, the Hepburn Act,
which relieves the carrier of goods from his common law liability
as insurer, provides that no contract, receipt, rule or regulation
shall exempt such common carrier from the liability imposed by
the Act.106 But, by the second Cummins amendment, this does not
apply to goods which the carrier has been authorized or required
104. I. A.. Art. 6, par. 5.105. 1. A., Art. 18, par. 5: "Passengers and baggage are accepted for
carriage only upon condition that, except in so far as liability is expressly
provided for in these Conditions of Carriage [which practically coincides with
the liability laid down by the Warsaw Rules] no liability whatsoever is ac-
cepted by the carriers, . . . and upon conditions that (except in so far as
liability is expressly provided for in these Conditions) the passenger renounces
for himself and his representatives all claims for compensation for damage
in connection with the carriage, caused directly or indirectly to passengers or
their belongings, . . . and especially in connection with surface transport at
departure and destination, whatever may be the legal grounds upon which any
claim concerning any such liability may be based." [Similar provision is made
respecting the carriage of goods in I. B., Art. 19, par. 4.]
I. A.. Art. 24: "Where in any country legislative provisions conflict with
these Conditions of Carriage, the latter shall be applicable only in so far as
they do not conflict with such legislative provisions."
106. 49 U. S. C. A. 20 (11).
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to carry at rates dependent upon the value declared in writing by
the shipper. 1° 7 Nor does this apply' to the interstate transportation
of passengers, and therefore state law must be looked to in this
regard: it is the general rule that common carriers of passengers
cannot relieve themselves from the obligation to observe ordinary
care, by any contract whatsoever, but that they may limit their lia-
bility by special agreement for a reasonable exemption from re-
sponsibility for injuries not arising from negligence. 108 The Harter
Act which governs the liability of vessel owners, contains a pro-
vision similar to Article 23.109
M. Goedhuis" raises the question whether a carrier could,
to avoid the difficulties of proving he has taken all necessary meas-
tires, stipulate in the contract of transportation that the proof of
certain facts will be equivalent to proving that all necessary meas-
ures have been taken, and conditionally answers the question by
stating that nothing in principle would oppose so doing. To the
present writer, it seems impossible to square such a stipulation with
the underlying principles of the Convention, one of which is to
secure uniformity not only as between countries, but also as be-
tween individual carriers. Another principle involved is that re-
strictive stipulations in transportation documents are often viewed
as a form of deception, and almost always represent compulsion.
Article 24. (1) In the cases coverd by Articles 18 and 19
any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought
subject to the conditions and limits set out in this Convention.
(2) In the cases covered by Article 17 the provisions of the
preceding paragraph shall also apply, without prejudice to the
questions as to who are the persons who have the right to bring
suit and what are their respective rights.
This :article contemplates that every cause of action embraced
or provided for by the Convention shall be brought in accordance
with its conditions.
Paragraph (2) of this article provides that in the case of the
death or injury of a passenger, national law may be resorted to for
determination of the proper parties plaintiff and the nature and
extent of their rights inter sese. In its failure to make specific
provision in this respect, the Convention is unlike most codifica-
tions."' This omission also leaves a doubt as to what domestic
107. 49 U. S. C. A. 20 (11).
108. Cooley, Torts (4th ed., 1932),.sec. 495: 10 C. J. 714.
109. 46 U. S. C. A. 190, 191.
110 Op. cit.. p. 218.
111. Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Victoria, c. 93, gives a right of action
for wrongful death to the personal representative for the benefit of the wife,
husband, parent or child. A United States statute as to death on the high
seas by wrongful death. 46 U. S. C. A. 761, similarly so provides.
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law shall apply, whether it shall be the law of the place, law of the
forum, etc.1 12  There is room for another question to arise: The
application of whatever domestic law governs may differ accord-
ing to the nature of the responsibility sought to be enforced. For
example, in Anglo-American common law, the rules applicable in
actions ex contractu differ from those in actions ex deli'to; a parent
of an injured child may sue the tort feasor for loss of services,
but could not sue one who has merely breached a contract with the
infant. What is the nature of the liability placed upon the carrier
by the Convention? It should be observed that while certain por-
tions of' the text emphasize the contractual relationship of the
parties, one must conclude from the terms of Article 20 that the
responsibility imposed upon the carrier is one based on fault. To
meet this incorporation of local law, Great Britain, in its Carriage
by Air Act, makes specific provision as to who may bring an action
to enforce liability in the event of the death of a passenger.1
3
Article 25. (1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail
himself of the provisions of this Convention which exclude or
limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful miscon-
duct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law
of the Court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be
equivalent to wilful misconduct.
(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail him-
self of the said provisions, if the damage is caused under the
same circumstances by any agent of the carrier acting within
the scope of his employment.
112. In the domestic law of the United States, whether or not the cause
of action survives is governed by the law of the place where the Injury
occurred: 56 L. R. A. 194, note. That statute would also determine who are
the proper parties plaintiff, and in whose behalf the suit may be brought.
Usher v. West Jersey R. Co., 126 Pa. 206, 17 A. 597, 4 L. R. A. 261 (1889).
The lex loci delicti also determines to whom the damages recovered shall be
distributed. Penn. R. Co. v. Levine, 263 F. 557 (C. C. A. 1920).
113. 22 & 23 Geo. V (1932): "1. The liability shall be enforceable for
the benefit of such of the members of the passenger's family as sustained
damage by reason of his death.
"In this paragraph the expression 'member of a family' means wife or
husband, parent, step-parent, grandparent, brother, sister, half-brother, half-
sister, child, step-child, grandchild:
"Provided that, In deducing any such relationship as aforesaid, any il-
legitimate person and any adopted person shall be treated as being, or as
having been, the legitimate child of his mother and reputed father or, as the
case may be, of his adopters.
'2. An action to enforce the liability may be brought by the personal
representatives of the passenger or by any person for whose benefit the lia-
bility is under the last preceding paragraph enforceable, but only one action
shall be brought in the United Kingdom in respect of the death of any one
passenger, and every such action by whomsoever brought shall be for the
benefit of all such persons so entitled as aforesaid as either are domiciled in
the United Kingdom or, not being domiciled there, express a desire to take
the benefit of the action.
"3. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding paragraph, the amount
recovered in any such action, after deducting any costs not recovered from
the defendant, shall be divided between the persons entitled In such propor-
tions as the Court (or, whera the action is tried with a jury, the jury) direct.
"4. The Court before which any such action is brought may at any stage
of the proceedings make any such order as appears to the Court to be just
and equitable in view of the provisions of the First Schedule to this Act
limiting the liability of a c, rrier and of any proccedngs which have been, or
are likely to be, commenced outside the United Kingdom in respect of the
death of the passenger in question."
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The important provisions of the Convention which "exclude
or limit the liability" 114 of the carrier are Articles 20, 21, and 22,
There can be no criticism in using the wilful misconduct of the
carrier to checkmate the contributory negligence of the injured
person, or, in a sense, to neutralize its effect. That was most prob-
ably the original reason for the development of degrees of negli-
gence, particularly where, as in Anglo-American common law, con-
tributory negligence defeats recovery altogether. But whether
this neutralizing effect should go .so far as to remove all limits
upon defendant's liability is another question, and there is good
ground for believing it should not. Some considerations on this
point follow:
(1) If proof of wilful misconduct is permitted to counteract
the effect of contributory negligence on right to recovery, that is
sufficient. It is not necessary to extend its effect to amount of
recovery, since the chances are that the injured person will not
have suffered more because the accident was caused by wilful mis-
conduct.
(2) Compensatory damages are not to be 'confused with puni-
tive damages. If the purpose of Article 25 is to punish the car-
rier, it is doubtful whether this is the proper method of accomplish-
ing that purpose, since this article will be applied not so much in
cases of what is patently wilful misconduct, as, rather, in cases of
a degree of negligence which courts will label wilful misconduct.
Such distortion will be induced, this writer believes, by the desire to
soften the effect of a statute which takes away a common law
remedy.
(3) In allowing to courts this amount of latitude to determine
what the equivalent of wilful misconduct is, uniformity, one of the
principal objectives of the Convention, is sacrificed. M. Riese,
however, seeks to justify this clause by pointing out' the wide
divergence of views among different countries as to the exact con-
tent of wilful misconduct."5
(4) The solution of this problem reached by the C. I. M. and
the C. I. V. is to double the maximum liability of the carrier where
he is guilty of wilful misconduct.""
Paragraph (2) is restricted in its application to where the
114. The expression Is also used with the same effect in Articles 3(2),
4(4), and 9.
115. In the French text, the word dol is used. Riese states that the con-
cept of jaute lourde should also be comprehended by this expression: "Ob-
servations sur la Convention de Varsovie," 14 Droit Adrien 216, 222 (1930).
Even in English and American law, "wilful misconduct" does not have an
altogether precise meaning.
116. Article 36.
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agent acts within the scope of his employment. It is not clear why
this restriction exists in this article and not in Article 20. There
was no discussion of this point by the delegates. There is a pos-
sible explanation of this seeming inconsistency in the fact that all
actions of the carrier's agents embraced in Article 20 would neces-
sarily be within the scope of their employment, while acts of wilful
misconduct would very often be outside such scope. The taking of
necessary measures to avoid damage, as used in Article 20, is
definitely a part of the duties of the carrier's employees. Such a
restriction therefore has no place in Article 20. Nor does this
leave a gap where there is wilful misconduct on the part of the
employee outside the scope of his employment, since an agent is
personally responsible for his own torts.
Does violation of government regulations by the carriers or his
agents constitute wilful misconduct? Almost certainly the answer
is yes, where such violation contributed in a causative way to the
accident. In this regard it is interesting to observe that in the 99
civil aircraft accidents resulting in fatalities during the last six
months of 1934, 89"persons were killed and 49 were severely in-
jured during flights in which the pilots ignored air commerce
regulations.'
Article 26. (1) Receipt by the person entitled to the de-
livery of baggage or goods without complaint shall be prima
facie evidence that the same have been delivered in good condi-
tion and in accordance with the document of transportation.
(2) In case of damage, the person entitled to delivery must
complain to the carrier forthwith after the discovery of the dam-
age, and, at the latest, within three days from the date of receipt
in the case of baggage and seven days from the date of receipt in
the case of goods. In case of delay the complaint must be made
at the latest within fourteen days from the date on which the
baggage or goods have been placed at his disposal.
(3) Every complaint must be made in writing upon the
document of transportation or by separate notice in writing des-
patched within the times aforesaid.
(4) Failing complaint within the times aforesaid, no action
shall lie against the carrier, save in the case of fraud on his part.
This article in effect states that if, in case of damage to bag-
gage, complaint is not made within three days after receipt, and
within seven days in the case of merchandise, a presumption that
the goods have been delivered in good condition will arise, and,
in addition, no action shall lie against the carrier, save in case of
fraud on his part. As M. Goedhuis points out,11 8 if the second
117. Ali Commerce Bulletin, Vol. 6, p. 248 (1935).
118. Op. cit., p. 226. Modifications suggested by M. Goedhuis are (p. 232)
(a) That the expression "person entitled to delivery" (destinataire) be replaced
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consequence attaches, paragraph (1) has no significance; since, if
the cause of action is barred, there can be no proceeding in which
the presumption can operate. There is a partial answer to this:
failure of the consignee to complain within the time prescribed
may take away his cause of action against the carrier, but it does
not take away his right to set up the damage as a defense to an
action by the carrier for the cost of the transportation. True, the
consignee would have to overcome (he presumption in paragraph
(1), but this would not be more onerous than the burden of prov-
ing any -affirmative defense.
However, there should be some recognition of the fact 'that
not in every case is damage apparent at the time of delivery, that
wrapped or packed goods cannot always be conveniently examined
at the moment of delivery. For this reason, the presumption pro-
vided in paragraph (1) should not arise until there has been a
reasonable opportunity to make such examination of the goods,
and at the end of another period of time thereafter, the right of
action should fail altogether.'1 9 These considerations suggest the
following re-wording of Article 26:
ARTICLE 26. (1) In case of damage to goods or baggage, the person
entitled to delivery must complain to the carrier forthwith after the discovery
of the damage, 'and, at the latest, within three days from the date of receipt
in the case of baggage and seven days from the date of receipt in the case of
goods. In case of delay the complaint must be made at the latest within
fourteen days from the date on which the baggage or goods have been placed
at his disposal.
(2) Failing to complain within such times shall be prima facie evidence
that the goods or baggage have been delivered in, good condition and in
accordance with the document of transportation.
(3) Failing complaint within three days after the times aforesaid, no
action shall lie against the carrier, save in the case of fraud on his part.
(4) Every complaint must be made in writing upon the document of
transportation or by separate notice in writing despatched within the times
aforesaid.
Article 27. In the case of the death of the person liable, an
action for damages lies in accordance with the terms of this
Convention against those legally representing his estate.
by one of broader meaning, e. g., claimant (ayant-droit) since It is not always
the consignee who wishes to make a complaint. (b) That in paragraph (2)
after the word damage, the words "or partial loss" be added.
119. The Brussels Convention provides (Article 6): "If the loss or dam-
age is not apparent, the notice must be givbn within three days of the delivery.
. . . In any event the carrier and the shipper shall be discharged from allliability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year
after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been
delivered."
The C. I. M. makes similar provision for apparent and non-apparent dam-
age: Article 44.
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In the expression "against those legally representing his estate,"
the Convention is virtually resorting to local law, and that, of
course, is the desirable thing. Matters of procedure, it was con-
stantly reiterated in the preliminary discussions, should be left as
much as possible to the law of the court before which the action is
brought. Furthermore, the question does not have a great deal of
practical importance in view of the corporate form assumed by
most carriers.
Article 28. (1) An action for damages must be brought, at
the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, either before the Court of the domicile of
the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has
a place of business through which the contract has been made, or
before the Court at the place of destination.
(2) Questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of
the Court to which the case is submitted.
Selection of Forum:
This article gives the plaintiff the option of bringing his action
in the court of any one of four possible places, provided it is
within the territory of one of the signatories to the Convention:
(1) The domicile of the carrier; (2) his principal place of business;
(3) his place of business through which the contract was made;
(4) the place of destination.
In any H. C. P. which is composed of federated states, the
question must arise whether the domicile referred to in this article
extends to the whole territory of the contracting party, or means
the component state in which the carrier has his residence if an
individual, or is incorporated, if .a corporation. This problem
would be presented in the United States. A carrier operating
across the border between Mexico and this country may be in-
corporated in Delaware. Does domicile mean any state in the
Union, or Delaware? If it is restricted to the latter state, there
is hardly any hardship on the plaintiff in view of the other choices
which he may make in selecting a forum.
In the preliminary drafts, a further choice of fori existed:
4. . .or, in case of the non-arrival of the aircraft, at the place
of the accident."12  This was omitted upon the motion of the
British delegate, on the ground that this "would be provocative of
great inconvenience and would give rise to actions which the car-
rier would find it very difficult to defend. ' '121 For example, in a
flight from London to India, where one passes over many countries
120. Compte Rendu, C. I. T. E. J. A., 3rd Session, p. 56.
121. Procas Verbaux, p. 77.
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having no well developed system of law, it would be a hardship
for a British transport company to defend an action in Persia or
Mesopotamia.
If this choice of fori is in any way a free one, the plaintiff
may, in exercising it, well consider those provisions of the Con-
vention which leave certain matters to be determined by domestic
law. If he has been contributorily negligent, he will bring his
action where that defense exonerates the carrier only partially,
rather than completely. 122 If his right to bring the suit is in doubt,
he will choose the forum whose law is most favorable to his bring-
ing the suit.123 If one of the above four choices gives him a chance
of proving wilful misconduct on the part of the defendant, it will
similarly be advantageous to choose that forum.124
In the Berne Convention (goods and passengers by rail), no
such choice exists. The action can only be brought before a com-
petent court of the state to which the railway defendant belongs.125
Article 28 mandatorily states that an action for damages must
be brought in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.
But where a plaintiff wishes to avoid the application of the Con-
vention with its limited recovery, what will prevent him from
suing in a state not a party to the Convention? If he does initiate
his proceedings in a non-signatory state, will that state, upon the
insistence of the defendant, enforce the terms of the Convention?
Two persons entered into an employment contract, electing to be
governed by the Workmen's Compensation Act of Vermont. After
an accident occurring in New Hampshire, the employee's admin-
istrator brought an action in that state based on New Hampshire
law. The defendant was successful in having the Vermont statute
applied, under the compulsion of the full faith and credit clause
of the Federal Constitution.126
In a second case, an action was brought in Texas for an injury
which occurred in Mexico. The final holding was that it would be
unfair to the defendant to deny him the advantages of the Mex-
ican law, but because the recovery details of that law could not
be effectively administered in an American court, the entire case
was dismissed. 27
In other words, as between two foreign states, there is no
122. See Article 21.
123. See Article 24 (2).
124. See Article 25 (1).
125. C. I. M. and C. I. V., Art. 42.
126. Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 52 S. Ct. 571(1932).
127. Slater v. Mexican National R. Co.. 194 U. S. 120, 24 S. Ct. 581 (1904).
See also Verdicchia v. McNab & Harlin Mfg. Co., 164 N. Y. S. 290 (1917)
Lehman v. Ramo Films, Inc., 155 N. Y. S. 1032 (1915).
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superior sovereignty compelling a court to apply a foreign law by
which the parties had agreed to be governed; and where the en-
forcement of such foreign law is optional, the court to which the
case is submitted may well refuse to apply it because of procedural
difficulties, or because it conflicts with local public policy.
Execution of Judgments:
The Convention makes no mention of reciprocity among con-
tracting states in the enforcement of judgments rendered under its
terms. Regarding this, one observer states :128
One would hesitate to introduce a provision of this nature for the limited
field of private aeronautical law, believing it preferable to reserve that for
an international accord on civil procedure.
To introduce such a provision would not represent a pioneer step
since both the C. I. V. and the C. I. M. contain such provisions.129
Besides, of all subjects for international accord, civil procedure
seems least feasible and most remote. A better reason for the
omission of such a provision lies in the fact that the Convention is
open for signature to all states, regardless of the stage of develop-
ment of their legal system; the C. I. V. and the C. I. M., on the
other hand, contain measures which give the signatory states some
voice in the admission of new states. 130
The lack of such a provision in the Warsaw Rules should
caution the plaintiff to select with care the forum in which to pur-
sue his cause of action. He should choose that jurisdiction where
sufficient of defendant's goods are located for the satisfaction of
his judgment.
Consolidation of Actions:
No mention is made in, the Convention of the possibility of
consolidating in one tribunal of causes of action arising out of the
same accident. Such a provision also was objected to by the
British delegate." 1 To be sure, there is not the necessity for such
a provision in a codification in which limitation is based upon a
128. Riese, "Observations sur ]a Convention de Varsovie," 14 Droit Adrien
216, 226 (1930).
129. Article 55. "The judgments which have been entered, either after
both parties have been heard or by default, by the judge competent in virtue
of the provisions of the present Convention, shall, when they have become
executory in virtue of the laws applied by the competent judge, be declared
executory in each of the other Contracting States, as soon as the formalities
required in that State have been complied with. No fundamental revision of
the question shall be allowed."
130. Article 59.
131. Compto Rendu, C. I. T. E. J. A., 3rd Session, p. 57.
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given sum per passenger or per pound of merchandise, as there is
where total liability in one accident is limited, as is true in the
Brussels Convention132 and in the Harter Act.15 8  But from an-
other standpoint, there is such a necessity. As has been pointed
out previously, by Article 24, the Convention does not attempt to
lay down any measures for determining, in cases of the injury or
death of a passenger, who are entitled to bring suit, and what are
their respective rights. By reason: of this omission it is possible
for different administrators of a passenger killed in an air acci-
dent, to be appointed in different jurisdictions and to prosecute
contemporaneously in different courts their rights of action against
the carrier. This difficulty could be remedied either by modifying
Article 24 so that it definitely specifies in whom the right of action
lies, or by setting up some means of bringing together in one forum
scattered proceedings based on the same cause of action.13 4
Recommendations: ,
The word "domicile" should be defined where an H. C. P. is
composed of semi-sovereign federated states.
Article 29. (1) The right to damages shall be extinguishedif an action is not brought within two years, reckoned from the
date of arrival'at the distination, or from the date on whichthe aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date on which the
transportation stopped.
(2) The method of calculating the period of limitations
shall be determined by the law of the Court to which the case is
submitted.
In the Berne Convention, the period of limitation is one year,
but extended-to three years in cases of fraud or wilful miscon-
duct.1 35
Article 30. (1) In the case of transportation to be per-formed by various successive carriers and falling within thedefinition set out in the third paragraph of Article 1, each carrier
who accepts passengers, baggage or goods shall be subject to the
rules set out in this Convention, and shall be deemed'to be one
of the contracting parties to the contract of transportation in sofar as the contract deals with that part of the transportation
which is performed under his supervision.
132. Article 8: "If different creditors take proceedings in the courts ofdifferent States, the owner may, before eadh court, require account to be taken
of the whole of the claims and debts so as to ensure that the limit of liability
be not exceeded."
133. 46 U. S. C. A. 183. Under the Iarter Act, the vessel owner may file
a petition for limitation of liability which has the effect of drawing to one
court all proceedings growing out of the same accident. See the case of Butler
v. Boston & Savannah S. S. Co.. 130 U. S. 527 (1889).
134. This difficulty has been partly met by the British Carriage by Air Act.See the portion noted supra, Article 24, footnote 3.135. C. I. M. and C. I. V., Article 45.
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(2) In the case of transportation of this nature, the pas-
senger or his representative can take action only against the car-
rier who performed the transportation during which the accident
or the delay occurred, save in the case where, by express agree-
ment, the first carrier has assumed liability for the whole journey.
(3) As regards baggage or goods, the passenger or con-
signor shall have a right of action against the first carrier, and
the passenger or consignee who is entitled to delivery shall have
a right of action against the last carrier, and further, each may
take action against the carrier who performed the transportation
during which the destruction, loss, damage or delay took place.
These carriers shall be jointly and severally liable to the pas-
senger or to the consignor or consignee.
Where goods are transported by successive air carriers, 13  by
virtue of one contract entered into between the shipper and the
initial carrier, it is eminently desirable from the plaintiff's stand-
point to be able to prosecute his claim to a final conclusion in one
action. To do this he must either join a1 carriers who performed a
part of the transportation, or he must be permitted to sue one
against whom collective responsibility may be asserted; this is so
because, in the majority of cases, the shipper cannot know in the
custody of which carrier the damage was sustained. At common
law, there was a further difficulty. If the plaintiff knew that the
damage occurred while the goods were under the care of a carrier
other than the one with whom the contract was entered into, his
action might be defeated because there was no privity of contract
between them.18
In interstate shipments in the United States, the Hepburn Act
permits the consignor to sue the initial carrier whether or not the
damage occurred during his portion of' the transportation. In
addition, the person sustaining the loss may sue the particular con-
necting carrier actually responsible for the injury. 8s
This device is adopted by the Warsaw Convention, with the
additional provision that the person entitled to delivery of the
goods may sue the last carrier.139  Further than that, both con-
signor and consignee may, apparently as a second chance, bring
action against the carrier who performed the transportation during
which the damage took place.14
136. Transportation performed by successive air carriers with which Article
30 deals, Is to be distinguished from combined transportation performed partly
by air and partly by any other mode of transportation, as treated in Article 31.
137. By providing that each successive carrier shall be deemed to be-one
of the contracting parties, the Issue of privity of contract is avoided by the
Convention.
138. 49 U. S. C. A. 20, par. 11.
139. Even in the extreme case where goods are lost in shipment, and the
last carrier never received them into his custody. M. Goedhuis (op. cit., p. 243)
criticizes the extension of this device to this extent; but see an express pro-
vision to this effect in C. T. M., Article 42, par. 3.
140. The C. I. M., Article 42, par. 3, provides: "The plaintiff can choose
between the said railways; once, however, the action Is brought his right of
choice ceases."I
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The perfect operation of this system of collective responsibility
of the first or last carrier would depend upon the existence of
inter-company arrangements for mutual assistance in the defense
of actions for damages, and for the apportionment among the re-
spective carriers of judgments so recovered. In the absence of
such arrangements, thq convenience that this short-cut represents
to the plaintiff is balanced by the inconvenience it means to the
respective carriers in two respects: first, where damage is caused
while goods are being handled by an intermediate carrier, and the
initial carrier is sued; the latter to avail himself of the exemptive
feature of Article 20 must prove not only that he and his agents
took all necessary measures to avoid the damage, but also that the
intermediate carrier and his agents did likewise; second, where,
under the above circumstances, judgment goes against the initial
carrier, he will be required to enter into new negotiations with the
intermediate carrier for reimbursement, which quite conceivably
might lead to further litigation. 141  However, the last sentence of
paragraph (3) stating that the carriers shall be jointly and severally
liable, may contemplate the possibility of the joining of all carriers,
and' if such joinder is permissible under local rules of procedure,
and to the extent that all carriers 'are subject to service of process
in one jurisdiction, this may be a solution of some of the difficulties
discussed above.
During such time as air routes, are not well established for the
transportation of merchandise, it is quite natural for shippers to
enter into separate contracts with different carriers for successive
stages of a long transportation. In such a case, to permit the
shipper to sue the initial carrier for damage occurring anywhere
along the line, while an advantage, seems hardly one to which he
is entitled in view of the burden this places on the first airline com-
pany to carry on the litigation after judgment is rendered against
him in the first instance. From this standpoint, paragraph (3) of
Article 30 might well except those cases of transportation per-
formed by successive air carriers wherein there is an independent
contract relation between the shipper iand each carrier. Article 30
makes no such distinction, but paragraph (1) does refer to the
third paragraph of Article 1, which states:
(3) Transportation to be performed by several successive air carriers
141. The C. I. M., while providing that actions may be brought either
against the dispatching railway, the railway of destination, or the railway on
which the event giving rise to the action took place (Article 42), also provides
that the Convention shall apply only to the specific railway lines enumerated
by the Convention, or appropriately added thereto (Articles 1 and 58). This
furnishes a facility for working out adequate inter-company relationships to
meet effectively the obligations imposed by such a measure.
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shall be deemed, for the purposes -of this Convention, to be one individual
transportation. if it has been regarded by the parties as a single operation,
'whether it has been agreed upon under the form of a single contract or of a
series of contracts ... 142
This paragraph is to be used primarily in determining whether the
Convention applies at all. If the court determines that it does, can
the initial carrier nevertheless rely on this same paragraph to urge
that the transportation in question was not regarded by the parties
as a single operation, in so far as the application of Article 30 (3)
is concerned? The proposition seems to be finely drawn but it
must be recognized that different considerations govern in settling
the above two issues. As far as collective responsibility is con-
cerned, each carrier involved in the transaction would naturally
urge the application of the Convention; but it could be emphatically
contended that to use Article 1 (3) to make Article 30 (3) apply
in every case imposes upon the first or last carrier an extremely
more onerous burden than would be his under domestic law.
By paragraph (2) of Article 30, a passenger or his representa-
tive can sue only the carrier on whose line the accident took place,
based on the theory that in such a case there would not be the
difficulty of determining the responsible party that exists in the
carriage of merchandise. But another reason exists for permitting
suit against the initial or last carrier in all cases, which is that to
require the plaintiff to sue an intermediate carrier will often neces-
sitate bringing his action in a foreign jurisdiction1 43 whereas, the
choice that exists for the shipper of goods (paragraph (3)) per-
mits suit to be brought either at the place where the contract was
entered into, or at the place of destination, either one of which
would probably be the jurisdiction in which the plaintiff is dom-
iciled. To be sure, Article 28 (1) would allow the passenger or his
representative to sue the intermediate carrier at the place of des-
tination, but would the defendant always be subject to process and
his goods subject to levy of execution in that jurisdiction?
With the development of air express agencies, the importance
of these problems will be minimized, as the consignor and consignee
deal with only one party, regardless of how many individual lines
the goods may be carried on.
IV. COMBINED TRANSPORT
Article 31. (1) In the case of combined transportation
performed partly by air and partly by any other mode of trans-
142. Italics ours.
143. In death cases, this would mean the appointment of a local adminis-
trator and other similar complications.
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portation, the provisions of this Convention shall apply only to
the transportatioh by air, provided that the transportation by
air falls within the terms of Article 1.
(2) Nothing in this Convention shall prevent the parties in
the case of combined transportation from inserting in the docu-
ment of air transportation conditions relating to other modes of
transportation, provided that the provisions of this Convention
are observed as regards the transportation by air.
The chief difficulty presented by this article is the situation
where goods are delivered in a damaged condition by an express
agency, part of the transportation being performed by air and part
by rail. Such coordinated air-rail and rail-air transportation is an
established service offered by Railway Express Agency. How will
it be determined whether the damage was incurred during that part
of the trip by land, or by air?
In such a situation, it seems there is the same need for a pre-
sumption that the damage occurred during transportation by air, as
there is in Article 18 (3) which treats of land transportation for
the purpose of loading, delivery, or transshipment.
V. GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS.
Article 32. Any clause contained in the contract and all
special agreements entered into before the damage occurred by
which the parties purport to infringe the rules laid down by this'
Convention, whether by deciding the law to be applied, or by
altering the rules as to jurisdiction, shall be null and void.
Nevertheless for the transportation of goods arbitration clauses
shall be allowed, subject to this Convention, if the arbitration is
to take place within one of the jurisdictions referred-to in the
first paragraph of Article 28.144
Article 33. Nothing contained in this Convention shall pre-
vent the carrier either from refusing to enter into any contract
of transportation or from making regulations which do not con-
flict with the provisions of this Convention.
It should be noted that this article does not state that a carrier
may refuse to enter into a contract of transportation; it only de-
clares that nothing in the Convention will prevent such refusal.
The implication is that the prohibition of such refusal by some
other, local, law would not be disturbed.1 4- This raises the general
topic of common carriers. The distinction between private and
144. No comment.
145. Compare the C. I. M.: "Every railway coming under the Convention
is bbund . . . to undertake the transport of goods accepted under the Conven-
tion, provided that the consignor complies with rules laid down in the Con-
vention..... :" Art. 5, sec. 1. And the C. I. V.: "Where an international
tariff exists for a given journey . . . carriage may not be refused, provided
that the passenger complies with the provisions of the present Convention:-
Art. 4.
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common carriers is important in three respects: it determines their
right to contract for limitation of or exemption from responsibility;
it fixes the degree of care which they must exercise in the pursuit
of their calling; and it determines their duty to serve all without
discrimination. As to the first two of these, the Convention speaks
finally and completely, drawing no distinction between the two
types. As to the third, local law is permitted to apply.148  The
result is that so far as the Convention is concerned, the distinction
between private and common carriers is absolutely of no sig-
nificance.
To this writer, this feature of the Convention is of extreme
importance, and heartily to be recommended. As stated by one
authority :147
It should be immaterial whether the aviation company in whose plane a
passenger is injured is a public or a private carrier. No reason appears why
those who carry on that most dangerous' form of aviation, the carriage of
passengers for the mere thrill of flight, should be able to make themselves
substantially immune from responsibility by inserting in the tickets a pro-
vision that they are free to refuse their services to anyone whom they may
choose to reject, although in practice this privilege is never exercised.
Article 34. This Convention shall not apply to International
transportation by air performed by way of experimental trial by
air navigation enterprises with the view to the establishment of
regular lines of air navigation, nor shall it apply to transporta-
tion performed in extraordinary circumstances outside the normal
scope of an air carrier's business.
VI. CONCLUSION.
In so far as the portions discussed in this article are concerned,
the Convention represents a significant forward step in a process
which must never be recognized as ended. No code of law is ever
expected to be perfect or complete. The most that should be
expected is a working model on which refinements may be made
from time to time.
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that a convention designed
for world adherence must lend itself to acceptance by many diverse
systems of law, without revolutionizing in too great a degree set-
tled notions of any one system. Provisions of a more or less
146. Pursuant to the terms of Article 33, the General Conditions of Trans-
port of the I.A.T.A. provide: "The carrier reserves the right to refuse to enter
into a contract of carriage without giving any reason:" I.A., Art. 13, par. 2.
In making no specific provision as to the duty of carriers to extend their
services to all without discrimination, the Warsaw Convention Is leaving no
important gap; this is strictly nof a question of private law, but rather a
matter to be decided by local public policy.
147. F. H. Bohlen, "Aviation Under the Common Law," 48 Harv. L. R. 216
(1934).
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general application should be used wherever possible. Emphasis
upon minutiae should be resorted to only when obviously necessary,
and from time to time as the goal of uniformity in at least the
broader aspects is more nearly achieved.
In the contemplated revision of the Warsaw Convention, much
important ground will be lost, this writer believes, if the text is
scrapped wholesale. It would be far more advisable to have only
a re-working of those parts which experts in law, in engineering,
in management, and other phases of the industry, and in govern-
ment, deem to be impracticable or undesirable.
